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ABSTRACT 
        The rapid growth in organic products has posed a major challenge to conventional 
retailer assortment planning. On the one hand, conventional retailers, driven by the 
relatively high margins of organic products, have increased organic product offerings. On 
the other hand, the shelf space for conventional retailers has remained the same, with 
newly opened stores much smaller in sizes. Therefore, retailers need to carefully manage 
their conventional product assortments to harvest the benefit of offering and increasing 
organic product assortments. In order to manage the assortment efficiently, conventional 
retailers need to understand how organic products would affect their existing products, 
consumers, and supply chain relationships.     
        From the two essays that comprise this dissertation, the first essay aims to explain 
how organic products would affect retailers’ conventional assortments, as well as how 
supply chain power would shift the connection between organic assortments and 
conventional assortment. The second essay estimates the substitution effect between 
organic products and conventional products, and how consumers choose between organic 
and conventional products while multiple other product attributes also present. Research 
questions proposed in the essays are answered by statistical analysis of difference-in-
difference analysis, instrumental variable regressions, and structural estimations on 
retailer scanner panel data that contains weekly product sales over a 4-year time horizon. 
vi 
        Our findings suggest that a market expansion effect due to the introduction and 
expansion of organic products outweighs the operational costs for increasing both organic 
and conventional assortments. However, the supply chain power structure between 
retailers and manufacturers as well as retailer shelf space constraints will shift the 
relationship between organic and conventional assortments. We also find that consumers 
are more price-sensitive in organic products, and organic condition, product style, and 
seller attributes are all highly influential in shaping consumers’ purchasing decisions.  
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CHAPTER 1 
OVERVIEW 
        In the last decade or so, the U.S. organic market has more than doubled in size 
(Organic Trade Association, 2018; see Figure 1.1). Driven by the relatively high margins, 
conventional retailers have increased organic product offerings. As a result, instead of 
being exclusively sold in local farms and national specialty stores such as Whole Foods 
Market, organic products are now available in many conventional supermarkets such as 
Publix, Kroger, and Target, and also in drug stores and convenience stores such as CVS 
Pharmacy and 7-Eleven. Despite the fast-growing trend for organic products, sales of 
organic food accounted for a mere 5.3% of total food sales in 2016 (Organic Trade 
Association, 2016), implying that 94.7% of total food sales is still attributable to 
conventional products. The rapid growth of organic products creates both opportunities 
and challenges for retailers and manufacturers. Moreover, this rapid growth also has 
complex effects on product assortment and supply chain operations decisions. 
        One of the major challenges for retailers comes from balancing the assortment 
between conventional and organic products given limited shelf space (Hooker & 
Shanahan, 2012). That is, although organic product variety has increased substantially 
during the past decade, retailer shelf space did not grow concomitantly. Moreover, newly 
opened stores are about 25 percent smaller than existing stores (McKinsey & Company, 
2013). Therefore, growth in total product variety spikes operating costs and increases the 
2 
possibility of stock-outs, which ultimately hurts retailers’ profits (Alfaro & Corbett, 
2003; Fisher & Ittner, 1999; Shockley et al., 2015; Ton & Raman, 2010). As a result, 
introducing or increasing organic product variety requires retailers to restructure 
conventional product assortments to maintain the total variety at a manageable level. This 
is of particular concern for stores that have tighter space constraints, such as stores 
located in urban areas and for convenience stores. Therefore, growth in organic product 
variety could possibly cannibalize conventional product variety, which ultimately hurts 
retailer’s revenue from the conventional product segment. 
 
Figure 1.1: Organic Sales and Growth 
        Another challenge for retailers is to understand consumer substitution between 
organic and conventional products. Recent studies suggest that although the “hardcore” 
organic consumers may be less price-sensitive, the majority of organic consumers do care 
about organic pricing. A 2009 study by the Hartman Group found that there are three key 
consumer demographics: While 21% of the total consumers buy organic products 
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exclusively, 65% of the total consumers buy both organic products and conventional 
products. The “occasional” organic consumers bring both opportunities and challenges to 
conventional supermarkets. On the one hand, carrying conventional products may reduce 
the loss of sales when a specific organic product is not available. On the other hand, 
retailers should also beware of low-margin conventional products cannibalize the sales of 
high-margin organic products. Therefore, it is important to understand how consumers 
choose between organic and conventional products and how much does conventional 
products cannibalize the sales of organic products. Especially for those retailers who 
carry both types of products. 
        In this dissertation, we investigate the impact of organic products on conventional 
products and on retailer assortment planning. In Chapter 2, we focus on how retailers 
would change their conventional product assortment when they first introducing organic 
products, as well as when they increase their organic product varieties. We use four years 
(2008-2011) of weekly scanner data obtained from Information Resources Inc. (IRi) and 
employ econometric methods to study the relationship between organic and conventional 
product offerings at the retail store level for the yogurt category. We find that, when 
stores first introduce organic products to one of their product categories, or when stores 
increase organic products to one of their product categories, conventional product variety 
in that product category also increases, ceteris paribus. This finding suggests that there is 
a market expansion effect from variety-seeking organic product customers who are drawn 
to stores because of the increase in organic product variety. Since the new variety-seeking 
consumers also tend to purchase conventional products, retail stores are encouraged to 
increase the variety of conventional products as well. However, we also find that this 
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market expansion effect is constrained by store size: while larger stores can increase 
more conventional product variety, smaller stores can experience an overall decrease in 
conventional product variety. This finding confirms the presence of cannibalizing effects 
between organic and conventional products when capacity constraints are significant. In 
addition, by focusing on product assortment decision-making across the supply chain, we 
find that for retailers facing highly concentrated manufacturers, the positive relationship 
between the introduction of organic products and conventional product variety tends to be 
weakened. That is, the higher costs and capacity constraints associated with product 
variety, tends to discourage manufacturers from increasing overall product variety. We 
also find that, for retailers with strong private-label presence, the relationship between 
organic products and conventional products is reversed. That is, retailers with strong 
private-label presence increase private-label conventional products at the expense of 
national brand conventional products when they expand their organic product offerings. 
        In Chapter 3 of this dissertation, we focus on the relative effect of product attributes 
(price, brand, nutrition information, style, etc.) and seller-related attributes (store type, 
store size, promotion, advertising, etc.) on consumers’ choices for organic products. We 
use four years (2008-2011) of weekly scanner data obtained from Information Resources 
Inc. (IRi) and employ structural estimation techniques developed in the empirical 
industrial organization literature to conduct our analysis (Berry 1994). Our main findings 
suggest that organic condition, product style, and seller attributes are all highly influential 
in shaping consumers’ purchasing decisions. Further, the relationship between organic 
and conventional products is much more nuanced and context-specific than previously 
shown. We find organic products always have a higher own-price elasticity than 
5 
conventional products, suggesting that even organic consumers are willing to pay a 
higher price, they are also sensitive to organic prices. We also find that the cross-price 
elasticities between organic products and conventional products are asymmetry. This 
asymmetry cross-price elasticity suggests that price change in conventional products has 
less effect on organic products than vice-versa, consistent with the asymmetric price 
competition literature (Sethuraman & Srinivasan, 2002). However, this effect is also 
content-specific. While in some product categories such as All-Natural yogurt and 
Creamy yogurt, price change in conventional products has a greater effect on organic 
products. This finding suggests that consumers have different preferences for different 
product specifications. 
        In Chapter 4, we conclude with a summary of findings, limitations, and future 
research directions.  
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CHAPTER 2 
ORGANIC PRODUCT AND CONVENTIONAL PRODUCT 
ASSORTMENT: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY 
ABSTRACT 
        The rapid growth in demand for organic products has posed a major challenge for 
conventional product assortment decisions in grocery stores. In this research, we address 
the research issue of how inducing organic product variety influences conventional 
product variety. Using theoretical arguments, we propose that supply chain effects, 
specifically, private-label presence and supplier concentration, influence this relationship. 
We also propose that store size can influence this key relationship. Conventional product 
sales account for more than 90% of total sales for grocery stores. While introducing 
organic products attracts new customers and increases demand, it may also cannibalize 
conventional product variety. Such effects have important implications to product 
assortment decisions in supply chains, and yet, this dilemma has received very little 
attention in the operations management literature. Using scanner data from retailers for 
yogurt purchases from 2008 to 2011, we construct panel-based econometric models to 
examine the relationship between organic product variety and conventional product 
variety. We show that when retail stores who have never sold organic yogurt in the past, 
first introduce organic yogurt to the store, conventional yogurt variety also increases. We 
also find that for retailers who expand their organic yogurt variety offerings, conventional 
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yogurt variety offerings also increases. Taken together, these results suggest a market 
expansion effect due to the introduction and expansion of organic products. However, in 
the presence of private-label products or with retailers facing more concentrated 
manufacturers, this correlation may be reversed; that is, the growth of private-label 
products mitigates the growth of conventional products. Also, when faced with more 
concentrated manufacturers, the growth of organic products lowers the growth of 
conventional products. Our findings suggest that when shelf space is abundant, retailers 
tend to increase conventional product variety along with organic product variety. 
However, if shelf space is limited, retailers are better off substituting conventional 
products with organic products.  
Keywords: Organic Products, Conventional Products, Variety, Assortment Management, 
Supply Chains 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
        In the last decade or so, the U.S. organic market has more than doubled in size 
(Organic Trade Association, 2018; see Figure 1.1). Driven by the relatively high margins, 
conventional retailers have increased organic product offerings. As a result, instead of 
being exclusively sold in local farms and national specialty stores such as Whole Foods 
Market, organic products are now available in many conventional supermarkets such as 
Publix, Kroger, and Target, and also in drug stores and convenience stores such as CVS 
Pharmacy and 7-Eleven. Despite the fast-growing trend for organic products, sales of 
organic food accounted for a mere 5.3% of total food sales in 2016 (Organic Trade 
Association, 2016), implying that 94.7% of total food sales is still attributable to 
conventional products. The rapid growth of organic products creates both opportunities 
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and challenges for retailers and manufacturers. Moreover, this rapid growth also has 
complex effects on product assortment and supply chain operations decisions.  
        The major challenges for retailers come from balancing the assortment between 
conventional and organic products given limited shelf space (Hooker & Shanahan, 2012). 
That is, although organic product variety has increased substantially during the past 
decade, retailer shelf space did not grow concomitantly. Moreover, newly opened stores 
are about 25 percent smaller than existing stores (McKinsey & Company, 2013). 
Therefore, growth in total product variety spikes operating costs and increases the 
possibility of stock-outs, which ultimately hurts retailers’ profits (Alfaro & Corbett, 
2003; Fisher & Ittner, 1999; Shockley et al., 2015; Ton & Raman, 2010). As a result, 
introducing or increasing organic product variety requires retailers to restructure 
conventional product assortments to maintain the total variety at a manageable level. This 
is of particular concern for stores that have tighter space constraints, such as stores 
located in urban areas and for convenience stores. Therefore, growth in organic product 
variety could possibly cannibalize conventional product variety, which ultimately hurts 
retailer’s revenue from the conventional product segment.  
        The rapidly expanding demand for organic products can be attributed to the 
increasing number of organic product consumers. Organic product consumers tend to be 
health-conscious, highly educated, have higher disposable incomes and lower price 
sensitivities (Krystallis et al., 2006). Moreover, 75% of organic product consumers also 
purchase conventional products when they find conventional products to be attractive . 
Their variety seeking behavior could also potentially “spill-over” to purchasing other 
products, and the resulting market expansion effect would benefit retailers who offer both 
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organic products and conventional products. This is especially appealing to new organic 
product consumers. A 2009 study by the Hartman Group reports that 21% of all 
consumers buy organic products exclusively, while 65% of all consumers buy both 
conventional and organic products (Chait, 2017), suggesting that this market expansion 
effect could be substantial. If this is the case, then the growth of organic products 
presents an opportunity for retailers to leverage growing demand from organic product 
customers by increasing both the variety of organic products and the variety of high-
quality conventional products. Therefore, the overarching question of this paper is: Given 
the market expansion opportunity and assortment challenges brought about by the 
introduction of organic products, how do retailers manage conventional product variety 
while introducing or increasing organic product variety? 
        From a supply chain perspective, the effect of growing product variety presents 
different challenges for retailers and manufacturers. Increasing product variety not only 
increases indirect costs for both manufacturers and retailers, such as inventory carrying 
costs and stock-out risks, (Alfaro & Corbett, 2003; Fisher & Ittner, 1999; Ton & Raman, 
2010) but also direct costs, such as increased setup times (Martin & Ishii, 1996) and 
change-overs (Van Ryzin & Mahajan, 1999), for manufacturers. These costs may be 
especially high for manufacturers who produce both organic and conventional products. 
Because of the strict and specialized production requirements for organic products , 
manufacturers could lose throughput volume and concomitant economies of scale if they 
introduce organic products and/or increase product variety for both organic and 
conventional products. Unlike retailers who could possibly benefit from increasing 
conventional product variety, manufacturers who try to increase both conventional and 
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organic product offerings would most likely face higher costs and resource 
cannibalization issues (Roberts & McEvily, 2005). This potential misalignment between 
interests of retailers and manufacturers leads to our second research question: How does 
supply chain power, as reflected via product assortment decisions, influence the 
relationship between the introduction of organic products (or increasing the variety of 
organic products) and the variety of conventional products? 
        A retailer or a manufacturer could influence product assortment decisions by 
exerting its power in the supply chain. For retailers, sourcing from a single manufacturer 
weakens the retailer’s control over assortment decisions and creates a source of 
bargaining power for the manufacturer (Newman, 1989; Porter, 2008). This is a common 
concern in category management, wherein retailers defer product assortment decisions 
within categories to a leading manufacturer (Kurtuluş & Toktay, 2004). Conversely, 
supplier’s (manufacturer’s) power over the buyer (retailer) is weakened when the retailer 
splits its total requirements among multiple suppliers (Burke et. al., 2007). Therefore, 
sourcing from a larger number of manufacturers allows retailers better control over 
product assortment decisions, which could then lead to a higher variety of both organic 
products and conventional products, thereby yielding higher total revenue.  
        Another common retailer practice with implications for product assortment 
decisions is the introduction of private-label products (Ailawadi & Keller, 2004). Private-
label products are defined as store brands that are managed by retailers and are often 
more profitable than products of national brands (Heller, 2011; Quelch & Harding, 1996). 
The presence of strong private-label products could lead to higher retailer power and 
lower power of national brand manufacturers (Chintagunta et al., 2002; Morton & 
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Zettelmeyer, 2004). Therefore, retailer with strong private-label product presence could 
utilize its supply chain power, which then leads to a higher variety of both organic 
products and conventional products.  
        Despite the importance of product assortment decisions in supply chains, the 
relationship between organic product growth and conventional product assortment has 
not been adequately studied in the operations management literature. As the first of such 
efforts, this study addresses the following two important research questions: (1) Does 
conventional product variety increase or decrease when organic product is introduced 
(or its variety increases) at the store level? (2) Does the control of assortment decisions 
in the supply chain affect assortments between organic and conventional products? 
Specifically, in the main analysis, we first examine how conventional product variety 
could change when retailers first introduced organic products to the store. Second, we 
examine how a retailer faced with more concentrated—and therefore more powerful—
manufacturers would make assortment decisions involving both organic and conventional 
product variety. Third, we examine how a retailer with the option of introducing private-
label products would make product assortment decisions involving organic and 
conventional product variety. As an extension, we further broaden our research question 
to examine how conventional product variety would change when organic product variety 
increases in stores who have already sold organic products. 
        We use four years (2008-2011) of weekly scanner data obtained from Information 
Resources Inc. (IRi) and employ econometric methods to study the relationship between 
organic and conventional product offerings at the retail store level for the yogurt 
category. The major findings from this research are summarized as follows. First, we 
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constructed a difference in differences study, using stores that started to sell organic 
product during our time of study and stores that has never sold organic products, to 
examine how conventional product variety changes when a retailer introduces organic 
products. We find that, when stores first introduce organic products to one of their 
product categories, conventional product variety in that product category also increases, 
ceteris paribus. This finding suggests that there is a market expansion effect from variety-
seeking organic product customers who are drawn to stores because of the introduction of 
organic products. Since the new variety-seeking consumers also tend to purchase 
conventional products, retail stores are encouraged to increase the variety of conventional 
products as well. However, we also find that this market expansion effect is constrained 
by store size: while larger stores can increase more conventional product variety, smaller 
stores can experience an overall decrease in conventional product variety. This finding 
confirms the presence of cannibalizing effects between organic and conventional 
products when capacity constraints are significant. Second, by focusing on product 
assortment decision-making across the supply chain, we find that for retailers facing 
highly concentrated manufacturers, the positive relationship between the introduction of 
organic product and conventional product variety tends to be weakened. This is because 
such retailers have less control over the assortment decisions in the supply chain. This 
weakening effect, which results from the higher costs and capacity constraints associated 
with product variety, tends to discourage manufacturers from increasing overall product 
variety. Greater manufacturer control over product assortment decisions, as indicated by 
a more concentrated manufacturer base, allows manufacturers to counter pressures of 
increasing product variety away from the interests of retailers. We also find that, for 
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retailers with strong private-label presence, the relationship between organic products and 
conventional products is reversed. That is, although retailers who have a strong presence 
of private-labels also have higher power over assortment decisions, conventional product 
variety in these retailers would decrease when organic product is introduced. In the 
extension, we further broaden our study to stores who have already been selling organic 
products, and examine what happens to conventional product variety when these stores 
increase their organic product variety. Therefore, we use all stores in our data and use 
instrumental variables approach to study the relationship between organic product variety 
and conventional product variety. In addition, we also examine how supplier 
concentration, private-label presence, and store size affects the relationship between 
organic product and conventional product variety. We find that conventional product 
variety is still positively correlated with organic product variety, and the same consistent 
results holds true in the presence of higher supplier concentration and private-label 
presence. This finding suggests that the market expansion effect is not limited to stores 
that first introduced organic products, but also holds for stores that have already offered 
organic products. We further find that retailers with strong private-label presence increase 
private-label conventional products at the expense of national brand conventional 
products when they expand their organic product offerings. In addition, after controlling 
for market demand and population density, we find larger stores tends to increase more 
conventional product variety.  
        Our research contributes to the operations management literature as follows. First, 
we distinguish how increasing organic product variety is different from a price 
discrimination strategy which is based on consumers' willingness to pay for quality 
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(Mussa & Rosen, 1978; Moorthy, 1984; Horsky & Nelson, 1992). However, while price 
discrimination strategy may not increase total demand (Quelch & Kenny, 1994), 
increasing organic product offerings increases total demand by attracting new, variety 
seeking organic consumers. Similarly, while price discrimination strategy is prone to the 
cannibalization problems (Randall et al., 1998), retailers actually benefit from the fact 
that organic consumers would also purchase conventional products. Therefore, we 
contribute to the literature by empirically investigating the impact of organic product 
variety on conventional products as an assortment outcome. Second, we contribute to the 
literature by establishing the role of supply chains in assortment decisions involving 
organic products. Managing organic products in supply chains poses a significant 
challenge to making product assortment decisions because the benefits and costs 
associated with organic product offerings are not congruent among supply chain 
members. We show that assortment decisions are associated with supply chain 
governance and control and that retailers benefit from market expansion and, therefore, 
play a leading role in the movement towards organic product introduction. We 
demonstrate that retailers with a larger percentage of private-label products, or those 
sourcing from a larger group of manufacturers, tend to have more control over the 
assortment decisions and tend to take advantage of greater organic product variety. Taken 
together, these findings suggest that the growth of organic products is demand-driven and 
that there is a variety-seeking organic customer base that spills over to the demand for 
conventional products, thereby expanding the conventional product market. However, 
this effect may be mitigated by small store size, which is indicative of capacity 
constraints. Our findings also highlight the fact that power distribution in the 
15 
manufacturer-supplier supply chain could affect the growth in conventional product 
variety. 
        The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 provides a review of 
the organic product and product assortment literature. Data, including dependent variable, 
independent variables, and control variables, are described in Section 2.3, and the 
difference-in-differences model is described in Section 2.4. The results are presented in 
Section 2.5. We present model extensions and discuss results and alternative explanations 
in Section 2.6. Finally, we provide the theoretical and managerial implications of this 
research and conclude in Section 2.7. 
2.2. LITERATURE REVIEW  
        In this section, we review the literature from three related streams of research: 
organic products, product assortments, and supply chain governance. Our review is 
grouped according to demand-side issues and supply-side issues as it pertains to our 
research questions. We first discuss the impact of organic products on the food supply 
chain. We then turn to product assortment decisions that have implications for retailers, 
manufacturers, and customers. Finally, we review the role of supply chain governance 
issues, such as power, in product assortment decisions.  
2.2.1 IMPACT OF ORGANIC PRODUCTS ON FOOD SUPPLY CHAINS 
        On the demand side, consumer demand for organic products has grown by double-
digits almost every year since the 1990s. Organic product sales have increased from $3.6 
billion in 1997 to $47 billion in 2016 (Organic Trade Association, 2016). Consumers 
value organic food because it is seen as being healthier, more nutritious, better tasting, 
and safer because no chemicals are used in its production (Bauer et al., 2013). They buy 
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organic produce according to the “dirty dozen and clean fifteen” standards, which 
identify groceries with the most pesticide residue and those with the least contamination 
(Pou, 2010). Organic farming is also perceived to be “gentler” on the environment and is 
therefore seen as being more socially responsible (Fotopoulos & Krystallis, 2002; Larue 
et al., 2004; Wier & Calverly, 2002). Consumers of organic products tend to have higher 
education, namely a graduate degree (Govindasamy et al., 2017; Grossman, 1972; 
Lockie, 2002; Schifferstein & Ophuist, 1998) and income levels above $75,000 (Kriwy & 
Mecking, 2012; Zhang et al., 2008). Importantly, this growing segment of consumers 
does not exclusively buy organic products. A 2009 study by the Hartman Group found 
that, while 21% of consumers buy organic only, 65% of consumers buy both 
conventional and organic products (Chait, 2017). Evidence shows that organic customers 
also purchase conventional products if they find them attractive, particularly when the 
prices of organic products are too high or when the supply of organic products is limited 
(Hudson, 2012). 
        On the supply side, organic products are expensive to grow and produce throughout 
the supply chain partly due to stringent standards (Dumas, 2015). The United States 
Department of Agriculture (USDA) imposes specific requirements that must be verified 
by an accredited third-party certifying agent before products can be labeled as “organic.” 
For instance, the use of synthetic fertilizers, pesticides, herbicides, irradiation, sewage 
sludge, hormones, antibiotics, and genetic engineering is strictly prohibited (USDA, 
2019). Other reasons for the higher cost of organic food include farming practices that 
usually require high labor content and the segregation of organic ingredients from 
conventional ones. All of these factors contribute to higher prices for organic products 
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compared to their conventional product counterparts (see Figure 2.1). At the same time, 
organic products enjoy higher gross margins, ranging from 30% to 50%, compared to 
margins of conventional products, which range from 20% to 25% (Bezawada & Pauwels, 
2013; Oberholtzer et al., 2006; Roheim & D’Silva, 2009). In sum, the growing organic 
product offerings provide opportunities for market expansion but pose serious challenges 
in product assortment decisions and cost efficiencies in the supply chain. To the best of 
our knowledge, no prior research in the literature of operations management has 
addressed these opportunities and challenges. 
 
Figure 2.1: Organic Food Price Versus Conventional Food Price 
Source: USDA, Economic Research Service estimates from Nielsen Homescan data 
(2010) 
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2.2.2. PRICE DISCRIMINATION STRATEGY AND ASSORTMENT 
        Introducing or increasing product variety for organic products is similar to price 
discrimination strategy, where organic products are introduced in the same product 
category but with a different price and quality balance (Pitta & Prevel Katsanis, 1995). 
However, the growth of organic product variety affects assortment decisions in a way that 
is quite different from traditional price discrimination strategy. In this section, we will 
first focus on assortment studies from the retailers’ and manufacturers’ perspectives, and 
discuss why it is different from price discrimination strategy.  
        From a retailer’s perspective, price discrimination strategy generally refers to 
increasing product variety, which stimulates sales by segmenting customers and 
attracting variety-seeking shoppers (Bayus & Putsis, 1999; Ton & Raman, 2010; Xia & 
Rajagopalan, 2009). Similarly, there are also challenges to carrying a higher variety of 
products. High variety drives lower inventory levels of individual items, which reduces 
the items’ visibility on shelves, increases the risk of stock-outs, and imposes high 
restocking costs due to the need for frequent replenishment (see Mantrala et al., 2009 for 
an extensive review). High variety also drives up operations complexity, which also leads 
to higher costs (Shockley et al., 2015). In addition, high variety is also constrained by the 
ultimate retailer resources----the shelf space available in stores (Corstjens & Doyle, 
1981). Last but not the least, high variety would lead to cannibalization; lower end 
products would cannibalize the sales of higher end products, leading to profit loss 
(Parlaktürk, 2012). 
        Given the tradeoff between profit generation and cost efficiency, prior research 
reports mixed findings of both a positive relationship between assortment depth and 
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category sales in some cases (Borle et al., 2005; Van Ryzin & Mahajan, 1999) as well as 
a negative relationship in other cases (Boatwright & Nunes, 2001; Broniarczyk et al., 
1998; Dreze et al., 1994). However, there are several aspects that sets organic products 
apart from traditional price discrimination strategy. Firstly, organic products attract new 
organic consumers to retail stores that previously did not carry organic products; this new 
customer base increases demand. We refer to such effect as “market expansion.” 
Therefore, price discrimination strategy is favorable to retailers because offering new 
organic products (or increasing variety of organic products) would actually increase the 
total category demand. Second, among these new organic consumers, the majority are 
also willing to buy conventional products. Imagine a scenario where a retail store only 
carries conventional yogurt products such as Yoplait and Dannon Original. When the 
store starts to carry Stonyfield Organic yogurt, it attracts new organic consumers, who 
had never shopped at the store. In addition, the majority of these organic consumers 
would also purchase high-end conventional yogurts such as Chobani Greek yogurt, which 
the store had never carried before. It would be more beneficial for this retailer to 
simultaneously introduce both the Stonyfield Organic yogurt and the Chobani Greek 
yogurt to better serve the new organic consumers. Therefore, due to the fact that the 
majority of organic consumers also purchases high-end conventional products, the 
cannibalization effect from the lower-end products (Yoplait and Dannon Original) to 
higher-end products (Stonyfield and Chobani) are less of a concern. Rather, retailers 
could introduce more high-quality conventional products to attract organic consumers 
when organic products are out of stock. Taken together, without the concern of steady 
category demand or cannibalization issues, we believe that the “market expansion” effect 
20 
of organic products would be more pronounced than the cost associated with increasing 
overall product variety. Therefore, increasing conventional product variety along with 
offering organic products will be more beneficial for most retailers.  
        From a manufacturer’s perspective, the introduction of line extensions by 
manufacturing firms is motivated by a number of factors including, targeting different 
customer segments and/or satisfying the customers’ desire for ‘something different’, 
matching a competitor’s successful line extension, increasing the firm’s share of retail 
shelf space allocated to the category, and utilizing excess manufacturing capacity (Quelch 
& Kenny, 1994). However, the pitfalls of product line extension are also significant. 
Over-segmentation would cannibalize company resource and confuse consumers; 
increasing number of suppliers would diminish manufacturing control and power; and 
ultimately, product lines would cannibalize each other (Quelch & Kenny, 1994; Roberts 
& McEvily, 2005).  
        More specifically, increase in product variety could lead to higher cost in the supply 
chain. This is because increasing total variety is not only associated with indirect costs, 
such as inventory stock-out costs (Alfaro & Corbett, 2003; Fisher & Ittner, 1999; Ton & 
Raman, 2010), but also with direct costs, such as increased setup times (Martin & Ishii, 
1996) and change-over costs (Van Ryzin & Mahajan, 1999). Therefore, simply increasing 
variety does not guarantee an increase in long-term profits and can, in fact, reduce cost 
competitiveness (Ramdas & Sawhney, 2001). Using a rational approach, firms should 
strive to balance the revenue and cost impact of variety decisions (Lancaster, 1990) to 
maximize long-term profits. MacDuffie, Sethuraman, and Fisher (1996) identify three 
types of variety—model-mix variety, options variety, and parts variety—and they find 
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that increasing parts variety significantly reduces productivity. For consumer product 
manufacturers, increasing organic product variety significantly increases parts variety 
because the raw materials of organic products must also be organic (e.g., organic milk, 
fruits, and vegetables), and therefore, they are different from materials used for 
conventional products (e.g., conventional milk, fruits, and vegetables). These raw 
material differences further complicate operations and increase costs by undermining the 
delayed variation strategy, wherein manufacturers benefit from the reduction in buffer 
inventories via risk pooling and increased flexibility (Lee & Tang, 1997). In addition to 
the costs of strategic changes, manufacturers also face higher costs as organic product 
variety increases because of the limited supply of organic materials and stricter 
regulations for production and sourcing processes of organic products (Klonsky, 2012). 
Taken together, increasing organic variety has much more significant cost implications to 
manufacturers than to retailers. The misalignment of interest between retailers and 
manufacturers is significant, and therefore, in the next section, we review supply chain 
governance literature and investigate how supply chain power influences the assortment 
outcomes on the retailer’s side.  
2.2.3. ASSORTMENT DECISIONS IN SUPPLY CHAINS  
        As we can see from the previous subsection, the effects of organic product 
assortment on retailers and manufacturers are different, with retailers largely benefiting 
from market expansion, and manufacturers incurring much of the costs. This divergence 
of interests and incentives across the supply chain highlights the need for considering the 
role of supply chain power structure on product assortment decision making. More 
specifically, product assortment decisions in supply chains are often controlled by parties 
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with power, which can be manifested by a higher concentration of retailers or of 
manufacturers. For instance, we expect retailers facing highly concentrated 
manufacturers to carry a different product assortment (which benefits manufacturers) 
than that from retailers facing less concentrated manufacturers.  
        Much of the long-established debate concerning retailer-manufacturer relationships 
has focused on the issue of power and the balance of power within these relationships 
(El-Ansary & Stern, 1972; French et al., 1959; Gaski, 1984; Hunt & Nevin, 1974; Lusch 
& Brown, 1982). Central to this debate is the issue of dependency, whether real or 
perceived. Steiner (1984) argues that the relative power of manufacturers and their 
retailers is governed by whether shoppers are inclined towards switching stores within 
brands or brands within stores. In the case of the former, manufacturers will dominate the 
channel, while in the case of the latter, retailers will hold sway. Next, we elaborate on the 
two key factors that contribute to the power relationships between the retailer and 
manufacturer. 
        First, a concentrated manufacturer base means that retailers will find it difficult to 
find alternative suppliers for products demanded by their end customers, which gives 
these manufacturers more power in the relationship. For example, because the soft drink 
industry is highly concentrated (dominated by Coca-Cola, PepsiCo, and Dr. Pepper), no 
major retailer can delist Coco-Cola and its high-performing brands. If a retailer were to 
do so, it might lose a big portion of its customer base. A concentrated group of 
manufacturers may create a consolidated force that influences product assortment 
decisions, which are, in turn, based on profit margins and product availability (Steiner, 
1993). For instance, powerful manufacturers may strategically choose to produce less 
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differentiated products, which reduces product variety and their own costs (Inderst & 
Shaffer, 2007). Therefore, when manufacturers are more concentrated, they have more 
power and control over product assortment decisions. Thus, in this case, lower 
conventional product variety is expected such that the combined product variety (organic 
and conventional) does not increase excessive direct costs. On the contrary, when 
manufacturers are more diffused, retailers have more power and control over product 
assortment decisions, and we would expect higher conventional product variety in stores 
so that retailers are able to benefit from the market expansion effect. 
        Second, power in the supply chain has largely shifted toward retailers over the years, 
aided by the proliferation of private-label products . Private-label products are store 
brands owned by retailers. This ownership often results in higher margins that provide 
incentives for retailers to grow their market share of private-label products via low 
wholesale and retail prices (Bontems et al., 1999; Meza & Sudhir, 2010). In addition, 
private-label products enhance store brands with better product and service quality, 
customer loyalty, store differentiation, and store profitability (Ailawadi et al., 2008; 
Corstjens & Lal, 2000; Martos-Partal & González-Benito, 2011). In sum, extensive 
private-label coverage yields retailers more power and control over product assortment 
decisions (Dunne & Narasimhan, 1999; Quelch & Harding, 1996). Narasimhan and 
Wilcox (1998) argue that retailers introduce private-labels in a category not only to gain 
profits directly from the private-label but also to use private-labels as a strategic weapon 
to elicit concessions from national brand manufacturers. More importantly, Meza and 
Sudhir (2010) found that retailers not only gain power from private-labels, but also 
strategically help private-labels gain market share by setting the corresponding national 
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brand product price higher than its optimal price. Similarly, research has also found that 
retailers would protect their private-label products by reducing the presence of the 
competing manufacturers’ products in their assortment (Alan et al., 2017). Moreover, 
lower quality national brand products are less profitable when competing with private-
label products (Alan et al., 2019). This raises a contradictory effect in our research 
context wherein retailers have greater power and control on product assortment decisions, 
and yet conventional product variety also decreases. Retailers with strong private-label 
product lines would utilize their private-label products to further increase their supply 
chain power. Therefore, such retailers could increase private-label product variety 
(organic and conventional) to attract organic product consumers, but at the same time 
decrease branded conventional product variety to maintain both operational efficiencies 
and enhanced supply chain power. Therefore, the overall effect of introducing organic 
products (or increasing organic product variety) on conventional product variety at the 
store level may be negative.  
        In summary, the rapid growth of organic products has challenged product assortment 
decision making in supply chains. This is particularly true for conventional products that 
remain the dominant source of revenue for most retailers. Because prior research that 
links assortment of organic products and conventional products is limited, we empirically 
examine the relationship between organic products and conventional product variety and 
test how this relationship is affected by supply chain power and the ensuing product 
assortment decisions. More specifically, we examine how manufacturer concentration 
and the presence of private-label products affect the relationship between organic product 
variety and conventional product variety.  
25 
2.3. DATA AND MEASURES 
        We first describe our data source and sample size in Section 2.3.1. Since we 
measure both the introduction of organic products (main analysis) and the increase of 
organic products (extension), we describe our full data sample in section 2.3.1.1, and the 
data sample used for difference-in-differences analysis in section 2.3.1.2. We then 
describe the dependent, independent, and control variables used in our analyses in 
Section 2.3.2.  
2.3.1.1 FULL SAMPLE DATA 
        We use four years of proprietary scanner data (2008-2011) from IRi, which reports 
data for grocery chains and drug stores in 50 markets in the U.S. (except Alaska and 
Hawaii). The raw data contains three files that separately report: 1) weekly Stock 
Keeping Unit (SKU) sales and unit price, 2) SKU attributes (e.g., product type, organic 
status, and product size), and 3) store information (location, chain affiliates, market, and 
store’s annual sales). An SKU is defined as a unique combination of brand, flavor, 
weight, container material, container size, and pack size. We first use the Universal 
Product Code (UPC) number to identify each SKU and then combine the SKU sales data 
with the SKU attributes data. We then use the store ID from both the SKU sales data and 
store information data to arrive at our final sample. We use data pertaining to the yogurt 
category for two main reasons. First, we observe weekly sales data only and not the 
actual shelf display data. Fast-moving items such as yogurts have a comparably shorter 
shelf life. Therefore, for such items, the number of SKUs sold in each week is a good 
approximation of the number of SKUs on the shelf. Second, the assortment of yogurts has 
changed dramatically over the years. For example, the total number of varieties of yogurt 
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in the US market soared 32% from 4,581 in 2008 to 6,053 in 2011. In comparison, the 
organic SKU category increased 30%, from 256 SKUs (in 2008) to 331 SKUs (in 2011). 
The yogurt category in the raw data has 7,112 SKUs in total, including discontinued 
SKUs and yogurt by-products, such as almond yogurt, buffalo milk yogurt, yogurt 
smoothies, and kefir. We dropped all yogurt by-products in our study to focus on the 
main yogurt category products. Figure 2.2 shows the time-series data of the ratio of total 
organic yogurt sales revenue to conventional yogurt sales revenue. As can be gleaned 
from this figure, the ratio of total organic yogurt sales revenue to conventional yogurt 
sales revenue in year 2008 was 7.73% (32 million dollars compared to 414 million 
dollars, respectively). In 2009, the ratio increased slightly to 7.77% (34.1 million dollars 
compared to 439 million dollars, respectively). However, since 2009 this ratio shows a 
decreasing trend. In particular, in 2010, the ratio decreased to 7.68% (33.7 million dollars 
in organic sales compared to 439 million dollars in conventional sales), and in 2011, this 
ratio decreased to 6.61% (28.9 million dollars in organic sales compared to 437 million 
dollars in conventional sales). The decline in market share of organic yogurt after 2010 
may reflect growing nonorganic sales of Greek-style yogurt and yogurt drinks, products 
that were not readily available in organic forms (USDA, 2017). Our final sample is an 
unbalanced panel dataset that contains 208 weeks of data for 1,896 stores in 50 markets. 
Two kinds of stores are included in our dataset: grocery stores and drug/convenience 
stores. There are 1,561 grocery stores and 335 drug/convenience stores in our final 
sample. Our dataset does not contain wholesale clubs such as Costco and Sam’s Club. 
Across all the stores, there are 6,053 yogurt SKUs, including 242 brands produced by 88 
manufacturers (including private-labels).  
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            Figure 2.2: Data Description: Organic versus Conventional Yogurt Sales 
2.3.1.2 DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES DATA 
        We further identify stores that has never sold organic products during the 4-year 
time span and stores that started to sell organic products during the 4-year time span. 
Among the 1,896 stores in the full sample, 113 stores began selling organic yogurt at 
some point during the study period (treatment), and 431 stores have never sold any 
organic product during the 3-year time span (control). By observing the store annual 
revenue, we find that the treatment stores are heavily skewed towards the “large store” 
side, therefore, for the quality of the propensity score matching, we further trimmed down 
our sample by dropping the treatment stores that fall in the top 10% annual revenue, and 
the bottom 10% annual revenue. Our final sample arrives at 81 treatment stores and 431 
control stores. In addition, out of the 81 stores that introduced organic products during 
our observed time span, 12 stores introduced organic products from a new supplier that 
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was previously not in the stores’ supplier list whereas the remaining 69 stores introduced 
organic product from an existing supplier.  
2.3.2.1. DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
        ConVarit represents the number of conventional SKUs in store i at week t. The 
number of SKUs is a well-accepted measure of product variety in the extant literature 
(Alfaro & Corbett, 2003; Borle et al., 2005; Fisher & Ittner, 1999; Wan et al., 2012). 
SKU is a unique identifier of a product; any changes in a product (i.e., manufacturer, 
brand, flavor, size, or packaging) would result in a new SKU. We specifically grouped 
and calculated our product variety variables based on the requirements of each of our 
research questions. For example, in order to test the effects on conventional product 
variety, we calculated the number of SKUs of conventional yogurt sold in store i at week 
t. As explained above, the number of SKUs sold is a good proxy for the number of SKUs 
carried in the store because yogurts are fast-moving items that have a relatively shorter 
shelf life. 
2.3.2.2. MAIN INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
        Treati represents the indicator for stores that began to sell organic yogurts during our 
time span. It is coded as 1 for all stores that launched organic yogurt products within our 
observed time frame and 0 for all stores that never sold organic yogurt products within 
our observed time frame.  
        Afterit is 1 for all weeks after organic yogurt is introduced for both the treatment 
group and its constructed control group, and 0 for all weeks before organic yogurt is 
introduced for both the treatment group and its constructed control group. Our focal 
independent variable therefore is the interaction between the Treati and Afterit. Using 
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difference-in-differences analysis, we compare the change in average conventional 
product variety in stores that do not introduce organic products and stores that introduce 
organic products. 
        PriLabelit represents the ratio of private-label SKUs to the total number of SKUs in 
store i at week t. To test the effect of private-label presence for a store, we measured the 
proportion of shelf space occupied by private-label yogurts in a store. Prior studies have 
considered private-label revenue share as a proxy for the proportion of shelf space 
occupied by private-label products in a store (Ailawadi et al., 2008; Corstjens & Lal, 
2000). However, this may not be an appropriate measure in our context because large 
revenue could be generated by a few product assortments. In order to account for the 
shelf space taken up by private-label products, we created the private-label product 
variety ratio, calculated as the ratio of the number of private-label SKUs to the total 
variety. We used private-label variety ratio instead of the number of SKUs of private-
label products because this ratio better represents the significance of private-label 
products at the store level. This measure is similar to the one used by Gómez Suárez 
(2005), who defined the percentage of space occupied by private-label as follows:  
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑡 =
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑏𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑆𝐾𝑈𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑖 𝑎𝑡 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘 𝑡
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝐾𝑈𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑖 𝑎𝑡 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘 𝑡
 
        HHIit represents the manufacturer concentration in store i in week t of year T. To test 
the effect of manufacturer concentration, we calculated the store level Herfindahl-
Hirschman index (HHI) for the store’s suppliers. The HHI is the most frequently used 
measure of market concentration to study market structure and firm performance 
(Cotterill, 1986). In our case, a higher HHI implies a more concentrated base of 
manufacturers for the store. In particular, we first calculated the ratio of annual revenue 
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generated by each yogurt manufacturer for each retail chain and then calculated the sum 
of the squared term of each manufacturer’s revenue ratio to the chain to compute the 
HHI. We use retail chains instead of single stores because product assortment decisions 
are mostly chain-level decisions, and store branches do not have the power to negotiate 
with yogurt manufacturers in terms of their product assortment offerings. We used annual 
revenue ratio instead of weekly ratio because revenue ratio may change dramatically on a 
weekly basis depending on store promotions, advertisements, and new product launches. 
In addition, grocery chains do not tend to negotiate with the manufacturers and change 
their product assortments on a weekly basis. We believe that using annual revenue ratio 
best represents the market concentration of manufacturers in a retail chain.  
𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑡 =∑(
𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑢𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑟 𝑗 𝑖𝑛 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑇
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑇
𝑗
)2 
2.3.2.3. CONTROL VARIABLES 
        We control for other time-varying product and store characteristics that could 
correlate with our dependent variable. 
        MeanPackageit represents the average size of products in pints in store i at week t. 
This variable primarily measures the average size of a product’s package. We calculated 
the average size of all yogurt SKUs to come up with this measure. Larger stores typically 
have higher average product size, and they carry more product variety than smaller stores 
(e.g., big-box retailers compared to convenience stores). Therefore, we expect 
MeanPackageit to be positively correlated with our dependent variable (ConVarit). 
        AdShareit measures the percentage of yogurt that was on store advertisements (e.g., 
posters) in store i at week t. The display of the products that are advertised may be 
different from the display of products that are not advertised. Stores may assign 
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additional space to the displayed products to catch the eyes of consumers. This could lead 
to a higher number of SKUs displayed in the original shelf space since the advertised 
products might be moved to the advertising shelf. Therefore, more unique SKUs may be 
sold (or stocked) in a store i with higher AdShareit, in week t. 
𝐴𝑑𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 =
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑆𝐾𝑈𝑠 𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑑𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖𝑛 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑖 𝑎𝑡 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘 𝑡
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝐾𝑈𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑖 𝑎𝑡 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘 𝑡
 
        DiscountShareit measures the percentage of yogurt that was on sale in store i at week 
t. We use this variable to control for promotion-related effects. Promotions may affect the 
total variety of the product assortment because promotions may attract more customers 
(Lam et al., 2001). Stores may adjust their product assortment decisions based on 
customer traffic. Thus, stores with higher DiscountShareit may have higher variety of 
products. 
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 =
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑆𝐾𝑈𝑠 𝑜𝑛 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑖𝑛 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑖 𝑎𝑡 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘 𝑡
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝐾𝑈𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑖 𝑎𝑡 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘 𝑡
 
        TotalQuantityit measures the store i’s total yogurt sale at week t. This variable could 
measure two different features of a retailer. First, larger stores will have higher total 
quantity of products sold. Second, this variable could represent the speed of sales. If a 
store’s products move quickly, the store may have higher demand. Thus, keeping more 
SKUs may help the store to achieve a higher fill rate. Therefore, we expect 
TotalQuantityit to be positively correlated with conventional product variety.  
        StoRevit is the annual revenue of store i in all product categories. Since we only have 
yearly revenue data, store revenue for a specific store remains the same for all weeks in a 
given year. In our study, this variable serves as another proxy for store size. Therefore, 
we expect StoRevit to be positively correlated with conventional product variety.  
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        OMit, CMit, and MMit, respectively, measure the number of organic suppliers, 
conventional suppliers, and suppliers that offer both organic and conventional products in 
the market where store i operates. These three variables capture the market level 
information for a store. 
        Table 2.1 gives a detailed description and summary statistics for the important 
variables in this study. Correlations of all the important variables of this study are given 
in Table 2.2.  
2.4. ECONOMETRIC MODELS AND ESTIMATION STRATEGY 
        As discussed earlier, in this research, we assess (1) the impact of introducing organic 
products on conventional product variety; and (2) the effect of supply chain power 
structure on the relationship between introducing organic products and the conventional 
product variety. To make an accurate estimation, we need to benchmark the changes in 
conventional product variety of a treatment group against a control group and employ 
difference-in-differences analysis. To estimate the impact of introducing organic 
products, we compare conventional variety change between stores that introduced 
organic products to those that never introduced organic products.  
        In an ideal scenario, stores should be randomly assigned to the treatment group 
(introducing organic products) or the control group (not introducing organic products), 
and the treatment should start at the same time for all treatment groups in the treatment 
group. However, in our research context, stores choose to introduce organic products, and 
they choose to do so at different times. Therefore, we face two methodological issues: 
self-selection of treatment group and sliding window for the treatment. 
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        The self-selection of treatment group may bias the estimation of treatment effect 
because stores may decide to introduce organic products based on other unobserved 
factors that relate to conventional product variety. For example, stores that want to attract 
more consumers may decide to introduce organic products, whereas stores that already 
perform well may decide not to introduce organic products. In other words, the average 
attributes of stores that introduced organic products may be systematically different from 
those who did not introduce organic products. This difference may bias the effect of 
treatment if we simply consider the stores that introduced organic products as treatment 
group and others as control group. To resolve this potential issue, we apply the propensity 
score matching method to construct a control group that is comparable to the treatment 
group in terms of the likelihood to introduce organic products before the occurrence of 
the actual treatment (Heckman et al. 1997, Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983). Because we 
have a relatively small number of treated stores (stores that introduced organic products) 
compared with the large pool of candidates (stores that never introduced organic 
products) for the control group, we specify a 5 nearest-neighbor matching. This 
procedure matches each store in the treatment group to 5 stores in the control group based 
on store characteristics that may influence the decision of a store to introduce organic 
products. The matching ensures that the treatment and control groups are co mparable 
before the treatment occurred. The variables we use to match the two groups of retail 
stores are average package size of the store (MeanPackage), advertisement share 
(AdShare), discount share (DiscountShare), and weekly sales quantity (TotalQuantity). 
        If the all stores in the treatment group launch organic products at the same time, we 
could easily separate the post-treatment periods from the pre-treatment periods and 
34 
compare the average conventional variety changes of the treatment and control groups. 
The sliding window of the occurrence of treatment complicates the definition of post-
treatment periods for the control group. For example, store A introduced organic products 
in the 10th week of 2008, whereas store B introduced organic products in the 20th week 
of 2009. It is then not straightforward to define which weeks should be the post-treatment 
periods for stores in the control group. To resolve this issue, we define the post-treatment 
period of each treated store as the weeks after it introduced organic products, and define 
the post-treatment period of each control store the same way as that of the treated store to 
which the control store is matched (Rosenbaum & Rubin 1985). For example, if stores C 
and D are selected to be the matched controls of stores A and B, respectively, then the 
post-treatment period of store C is the 10th week of 2008 and subsequent weeks, and the 
post-treatment period of store D is the 20th week of 2009 and subsequent weeks.  
2.4.1. PROPENSITY SCORE MATCHING 
        To assess the effect of introducing organic products, we apply a propensity score 
matching model to obtain a control group that could serve as a good counterfactual, 
against which we benchmark the conventional product variety change in stores after 
introducing organic products. In this model, we use a Probit regression, where the 
introduction of organic products is coded as a binary dependent variable. The covariates 
include factors that potentially influence the decision to introduce organic products (the 
matching variables listed above). Because a store could introduce organic products during 
any week in the 208 weeks of our data, we treat each time period as discrete (Sianesi 
2004) and perform the propensity score matching in each given week (i.e., 208 times). 
More specifically, in each week t, we use the average values of covariates from week 1 to 
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week t-1 as independent variables in the matching model (Austin 2011). We specify 
model (2.1) for each store i at week t: 
Pr(𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑡 = 1|𝑍𝑖𝑡) = ɸ(𝑍𝑖𝑡𝛽), ∀𝑡 = 1, 2, … , 208;        𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒   𝑍𝑖𝑡 =
1
𝑡−1
∑ 𝑋𝑖𝑘
𝑡−1
𝑘=1                               (2.1) 
where Xik is a vector of all matching variables including MeanPackage, AdShare, 
DiscountShare, and TotalQuantity for store i at week t, and Zit is the average of the above 
variables from week 1 to week t-1. Since we will use PriLabel, HHI, and StoRev as 
indicators of supply chain power and shelf space constraints in our main analysis, we do 
not include them in the propensity score matching to avoid multicollinearity issues in our 
regression models. Further, we use the nearest-neighbor matching algorithm to select five 
control firms that share the closest propensity scores with each treated firm with 
replacement. To ensure that the average conventional product variety change of the five 
control stores serves as an appropriate counterfactual for that of the corresponding treated 
store, we weigh each treated observation by 1 and each control store by sampled 
frequency divided by 5 (Hirano et al. 2003, Stuart 2010). For example, if a control store 
was assigned to one treated store, its weight is one-fifth; if a control store was assigned to 
two treated stores, its weight is two-fifths. We then multiply the dependent variable and 
covariates by the assigned weight (Winship & Radbill 1994, Wooldridge 2010) and use 
these adjusted values in the difference-in-differences regression. 
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Table 2.1: Variable Description 
Variable Description Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
ConVar Conventional product variety 66281 52.5378 63.52492 1 347 
Treat Stores that introduced organic products 66281 0.22899 0.420189 0 1 
After Treated time for both treatment and control group  66281 0.62393 0.484400 0 1 
PriLabel Ratio of private-label yogurt SKU to total yogurt SKU  66281 0.08825 0.124820 0 1 
HHI Chain HHI Index 66281 8.19546 0.282526 7.27077 9.21034 
StoRev The store total revenue of the year, a proxy of store size 66281 24.0418 16.92419 0.11 146.241 
MeanPackage The average package size of yogurt 66281 0.60617 0.212650 0.25 1.313043 
DiscountShare The percentage of yogurt sold was discounted 66281 0.18127 0.247328 0 1 
AdShare The percentage of yogurt sold was advertised 66281 0.01962 0.068802 0 0.861111 
TotalQuantity The number of yogurt sold at store 66281 684.819 1252.966 1 14380 
OM Number of organic product suppliers on the market 66281 4.22700 1.67215 0 9 
CM Number of conventional product suppliers on the market 66281 12.8822 4.99443 2 38 
MM Number of mixed product suppliers on the market 66281 2.76890 1.049969 0 6 
                          
                         Table 2.2: Correlation Table  
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 ConVar 1         
2 OrgVar 0.677 1        
3 PriLabel 0.2474 -0.0699 1       
4 HHI -0.4601 -0.3572 -0.0375 1      
5 MeanPackage 0.5519 0.2041 0.6051 -0.1513 1     
6 DiscountShare 0.2184 0.0284 0.1951 -0.098 0.2154 1    
7 AdShare 0.2599 0.1129 0.2189 -0.055 0.1954 0.4723 1   
8 TotalQuantity 0.6143 0.6827 0.1057 -0.2408 0.2851 0.0904 0.1625 1  
9 StoRev 0.6263 0.6457 0.2225 -0.2187 0.3999 0.0447 0.1033 0.8832 1 
                         Notes. Bold denotes significance at p < .05 level.
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2.4.2. DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES ANALYSIS 
2.4.2.1 THE EFFECT OF INTRODUCING ORGANIC PRODUCTS 
        To assess the effect of introducing organic products on conventional product variety, 
we use a difference-in-differences regression. The main dependent variable is the variety 
of conventional product (ConVar) and the independent variables are binary treatment 
indicator of Treat and the binary indicator of the post-treatment After. We are interested 
in the interaction term of the above two binary variables. Conventional product variety 
could also be affected by unobserved store characteristics and market conditions. 
Therefore, we further control for organic supplier in the market (OM), conventional 
supplier in the market (CM), and mixed supplier in the market as our control (MM). We 
use a fixed effects model to control for non-time varying variables. Equation (2.2), 
below, shows the main model that estimates the effect of introducing organic product 
variety on conventional product variety. 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 ∗ 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝜸𝑿𝒊𝒕 + 𝜌𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡                        (2.2) 
where i indexes store and t indexes week. X denotes the vector of control variables, 
including PriLabel, HHI, StoRev, OM, CM, and MM. δt denotes dummies for time-fixed 
effects, λi denotes dummies for store fixed effects, and εit is the error term. By controlling 
for both time and store fixed effects, we are able to account for all time invariant effects 
such as geographic area and store type as well as for any seasonal effects on product 
assortment decisions.  
2.4.2.2 THE EFFECT OF SUPPLY CHAIN POWER 
        To assess the effect of how supply chain power affects the relationship between 
introducing organic products and the variety of conventional products, we further include 
 
38 
the interaction of the supply chain power variables with the interaction of Treat and After 
and assess the three-way interaction terms. Specifically, Equation (2.3) and Equation 
(2.4) show the interaction effect of supplier concentration (HHI) and the effect of private-
label ratio (PlRatio), respectively. 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 ∗ 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝜸𝑿𝒊𝒕 + 𝜌𝑖 +
𝛿𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡                                                                                                                                                       (2.3) 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑙𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑃𝑙𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 ∗ 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝜸𝑿𝒊𝒕 + 𝜌𝑖 +
𝛿𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡                                                                                                                                                      (2.4) 
2.4.2.2 THE EFFECT OF STORE SIZE CONSTRAINT 
        As discussed earlier, we use annual store revenue (StoRev) as the proxy of store size 
in our data. Similar to 2.4.2.2, we use the three-way interaction term among Treat, After 
and StoRev to assess the effect of how store size constraint would affect the relationship 
between introducing organic products and the variety of conventional products. Equation 
(2.5) below presents our model. 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 ∗ 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝜸𝑿𝒊𝒕 + 𝜌𝑖 +
𝛿𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡                                                                                                                              (2.5) 
        We acknowledge that annual store revenue (StoRev) may not be the perfect measure 
for store size; therefore, we perform additional validations in the extension section 2.6.4.  
2.5. RESULTS 
        First, we report the results regarding the effect of introducing organic products and 
how supply chain power affects this relationship. Next, we check the robustness of our 
results. 
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2.5.1. MAIN RESULTS 
        The difference-in-differences regression estimates of Equation (2.2) are reported in 
Table 2.3. First, we find that introducing organic products increases the conventional 
product variety (β3= 11.59, p < .01). We also find that, through the three-way interaction, 
that stores with higher private-label ratio have lower conventional product variety after 
introducing organic products (β4= -49.94, p < .05), while larger stores have higher 
conventional product variety after introducing organic products (β4= 0.740, p < .05). The 
moderating effect of supplier concentration is not significant in our current model. We 
believe that this may be driven by the fact that the majority of our treatment stores source 
from existing suppliers when they first introduced organic products, and only a small 
portion of our treatment stores acquired a new supplier when they first introduced organic 
products. Sourcing from a new supplier may send out signals to existing suppliers that 
threatens the dependency of the retailer on the suppliers. Therefore, stores that already 
have less concentrated supplier (lower HHI) base would gain more negotiation power 
from introducing organic products and push for more conventional product variety from 
the existing conventional suppliers. On the other hand, sourcing from existing suppliers 
does not send out a signal of threatening the dependency on existing suppliers, therefore 
supplier concentration does not play a significant role in this case. To separate these two 
groups, we further perform two sets of analyses where we either keep treatment stores 
that used new suppliers (12 stores), or treatment stores that did not use new suppliers (69 
stores). We first apply the same propensity score matching process on the 12 treatment 
stores that used new suppliers with all 431 control stores, and re-run Models (2.2) to 
(2.5). We then perform another propensity score matching on the 69 stores that did not 
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use new suppliers with the same 431 control stores, and again re-run Models (2.2) to 
(2.5). Table 4 shows the result of these two sets of analyses. We could see that (“New 
Supplier” tab, (results (6)) stores with higher HHI have lower conventional product 
variety after introducing organic products (β4= -31.78, p < .01). On the other hand, stores 
that did not use new supplies ( “Existing Supplier” tab, result (11)) do not exhibit this 
effect.   
2.5.2. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
        We made changes in our propensity score matching process to see if our results are 
robust. First, we use three and one nearest neighbor matching instead of five nearest 
neighbors. For three nearest neighbor matching, we find consistent treatment effect (β3= 
13.69, p < .01), private-label ratio (β4= - 59.41, p < .05), and store size effect (β4= 0. 93, p 
< .01). For one nearest neighbor matching, we also find consistent treatment effect (β3= 
13.97, p < .01), private-label ratio (β4= -56.57, p < .05), and store size effect (β4= 0.94, p 
< .01). Although HHI effect is not significant using the full sample for three and one 
nearest neighbor matching as well, we find consistent effect of HHI when using the 
subsample of the 12 stores that used new suppliers for both three nearest neighbor 
matching (β4= -23.66, p < .05) and one nearest neighbor matching (β4= -24.47, p < .1).  
        Second, because our matching results in the main analysis may depend on the 
matching sequence, which starts the matching from week 1 up to week 208. Thus, it is 
possible that the quality of the matches declines in later weeks. Therefore, we may have a 
biased control group for the treatment stores that introduced organic products in the later 
phase of our time span. To ensure that our results are not affected by this potential bias, 
we rematch the treatment group and control group using reverse-time sequence (week 
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208 to 1). Our results show consistent effect of treatment effect (β3= 10.80, p < .01), 
private-label ratio effect (β4= -58.15, p < .05), and store size effect (β4= 0.90, p < .1).  
2.6. EXTENSIONS 
        In the main analysis, we examined the impact of introducing organic products on 
conventional product variety. As a first extension, using instrumental variables 
regression, we study the impact of increasing organic product variety on conventional 
product variety in Section 2.6.1 below.    
6.1. ECONOMETRIC MODELS AND ESTIMATION STRATEGY 
        Equation (2.6), below, shows the model that estimates the effect of organic product 
variety on conventional product variety  
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑂𝑟𝑔𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝜸𝑿𝒊𝒕 + 𝜆𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡                                          (2.6) 
where i indexes store and t indexes week. OrgVarit represents the number of organic 
SKUs in store i at week t. In order to test the relationship between organic product variety 
and conventional product variety at the store level, we calculated the number of SKUs of 
organic yogurt sold in store i at week t as our main independent variable. X denotes the 
vector of control variables, as described above in Section 2.3.2.3. As before, δt denotes 
dummies for time-fixed effects, λi denotes dummies for store-fixed effects, and εit is the 
error term.  
        In our study, the number of organic yogurt SKUs (OrgVarit) may not be an 
exogenous variable because a manager may carry a specific amount of variety of organic 
products on the basis of certain store and product characteristics that we are unable to 
observe. In addition, store managers may decide on their organic product offerings based 
on conventional product offerings. Therefore, there may be a reverse causal relationship 
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between organic product variety and conventional product variety. In order to control for 
these potential endogeneity issues, we use a two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression to 
estimate Equation (2.6) above. In particular, we use the number of organic suppliers in 
the store as an instrument for organic product variety. Conceptually, organic products are 
supplied by organic product suppliers; therefore, the number of organic suppliers a store 
has relationship with could affect organic product variety. Thus, it satisfies the relevance 
requirement of an instrument variable. On the other hand, since organic suppliers do not 
have control on what conventional products are supplied to the store, the number of 
organic suppliers would not directly impact conventional product variety that a store 
offers. Thus, the exclusion requirement of an instrumental variable is also met. 
        We use fixed effects 2SLS panel data analysis, with standard errors clustered at the 
retail-chain level, to test the effect of organic product variety on conventional product 
variety. We cluster our standard errors at the retail-chain level because stores within the 
same chain may undertake similar operations, and therefore, the observations gathered 
from the same retail chain may be correlated. As explained above, the store fixed effects 
control for all time-invariant unobserved variables, such as store location and store size, 
and the time fixed effects control for seasonality. 
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Table 2.3: Main Results 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variable Names ConVar ConVar ConVar ConVar 
          
After -4.544*** -11.51 -5.097*** -6.409*** 
 (1.024) (17.21) (1.107) (1.386) 
Treat*After 11.59*** -55.78 17.07*** -2.016 
 (2.855) (95.21) (4.885) (3.267) 
Treat*HHI  -53.43***   
  (14.55)   
After*HHI  0.909   
  (2.024)   
Treat*After*HHI  8.099   
  (11.68)   
Treat*PlRatio   -11.27  
   (37.05)  
After*PlRatio   27.83***  
   (8.951)  
Treat*After*PlRatio   -49.94**  
   (20.50)  
Treat*StoRev    1.357 
    (4.285) 
After*StoRev    0.309** 
    (0.148) 
Treat*After*StoRev    0.740** 
    (0.296) 
HHI -0.682 2.952 -1.001 0.214 
 (6.286) (3.708) (6.463) (6.072) 
PlRatio -59.65* -64.08* -70.66* -58.58* 
 (34.00) (33.27) (37.51) (33.01) 
StoRev 0.149 -0.0637 0.0186 -1.563 
 (0.656) (0.759) (0.623) (4.314) 
OM -0.892 -0.757 -0.917 -0.601 
 (0.631) (0.688) (0.667) (0.633) 
CM -2.377*** -2.046*** -2.253*** -2.176*** 
 (0.415) (0.381) (0.417) (0.394) 
MM -0.144 -0.169 -0.115 -0.137 
 (0.760) (0.776) (0.732) (0.772) 
     
Observations 48,446 48,446 48,446 48,446 
R-squared 0.329 0.356 0.340 0.349 
Number of iri_key 302 302 302 302 
Store/Week FE YES YES YES YES 
Notes. * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. Clustered Robust Standard errors in parenthesis.
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Table 2.4: Introducing Organic Products from A New Supplier 
  New Supplier Existing Supplier 
 (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
VARIABLES ConVar ConVar ConVar ConVar ConVar ConVar ConVar ConVar 
Treat*After 6.526* 265.3*** 19.29* 11.50 11.17*** -94.22 16.12*** -5.243 
 (3.781) (64.04) (10.52) (7.693) (3.548) (107.1) (5.797) (3.802) 
Treat*After*HHI  -31.7
***    12.75   
  (7.819)    (13.15)   
Treat*After*PlRatio   -62.26
*    -47.69
*  
   (33.06)    (24.15)  
Treat*After*StoRev    -0.542    0.874
*** 
    (0.424)    (0.258) 
PlRatio -72.34** -71.81** -88.45** -71.86** -64.37** -67.9*** -67.4*** -61.11** 
 (28.38) (28.23) (34.43) (28.52) (24.09) (23.00) (18.69) (22.77) 
StoRev 1.533 1.668 1.727 0.572 0.609 0.478 0.460 0.493 
 (2.589) (2.540) (2.591) (2.647) (0.509) (0.603) (0.516) (2.987) 
HHI -0.0559 -0.500 -0.500 0.530 0.179 4.561 -0.355 0.926 
 (7.284) (5.845) (7.193) (7.051) (6.516) (3.744) (6.668) (6.438) 
Observations 23,046 23,046 23,046 23,046 45,753 45,753 45,753 45,753 
R-squared 0.354 0.362 0.364 0.357 0.334 0.361 0.349 0.360 
Number of Store 143 143 143 143 279 279 279 279 
Store/Week FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Notes. * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. Clustered Robust Standard errors in parenthesis. Some variables are omitted for brevity.
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        Equation (2.7), shown below, is used to test the moderating effect of private-label on 
the relationship of organic product variety with conventional product variety. Thus, the 
coefficient of the interaction term becomes our variable of interest.  
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑂𝑟𝑔𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑟𝑖𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑂𝑟𝑔𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝜸𝑿𝒊𝒕 + 𝜆𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡   (2.7) 
        It should be noted that the interaction term may be endogenous because of the 
potential endogeneity of organic product variety, as explained above. We use additional 
instrumental variables to address the endogeneity of the interaction variable. In particular, 
we use the interaction of PriLabelit with the instrumental variable (number of organic 
suppliers) as an instrument for the interaction variable (Wooldridge, 2010). Therefore, we 
use two instruments for two potentially endogenous variables (OrgVarit and OrgVarit* 
PriLabelit). 
        Equation (2.8), given below, tests the moderating effect of the HHI.  
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑂𝑟𝑔𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑂𝑟𝑔𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝜸𝑿𝒊𝒕 + 𝜆𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡         (2.8) 
        Similar to the estimation of Equation (7), we use two instrumental variables for two 
potentially endogenous variables (OrgVarit and OrgVarit *HHIit). 
2.6.2. RESULTS FOR INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES REGRESSION 
       We performed VIF tests to check for potential multicollinearity issues. We find that 
the VIFs for MeanPackage and TotalQuantity are 48.31 and 10.45, respectively. As the 
high VIF scores raise concern for multicollinearity, we dropped these two control 
variables (MeanPackage and TotalQuantity) and reran our analysis. The mean VIF after 
dropping these two variables is 4.30 and no variable VIF exceeds the value of 10. 
Therefore, multicollinearity is no longer a concern in our model.  
        Table 2.5 (result (13)) shows that the effect of organic product variety on 
conventional product variety is positive and highly significant (β1= 0.9708, p < .01), 
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which suggests that an increase in organic product variety is associated with an increase 
in conventional product variety in stores. In addition, we translate the coefficient to 
elasticity by 𝑒 = 𝛽 ∗
𝑋
𝑌
. Using the average values of organic product variety and 
conventional product variety for X and Y, respectively and using β1= 0.9708, the 
elasticity of our model is 0.094. This implies that conventional product variety increases, 
on average, by 0.094% for a 1% increase in organic product variety. 
        Table 2.5, Result (14), shows a negative coefficient (β3= -3.9745, p < .01) of the 
interaction term between organic product variety and the private-label ratio. Thus, the 
private-label ratio negatively moderates the association between organic product variety 
and conventional product variety. The total effect of organic product variety on 
conventional product variety in stores that hold private-label products is β1+ β3* 
PriLabelit. When the private-label variety ratio is less than 41.8% (i.e., 1.6628-3.9745 * 
PriLabelit = 0 and PriLabelit = 0.418), additional organic product variety would increase 
conventional product variety in the store. However, if the private-label variety ratio is 
greater than 41.8%, increasing organic product variety would lead to a decrease in 
conventional product variety. To further illustrate this finding, we plot the marginal 
effects of organic product variety. As shown in Figure 2.3, the average marginal effect of 
organic product variety decreases as the private-label ratio increases. The average 
marginal effect of organic product variety even becomes negative when the private-label 
ratio exceeds 0.418. As a further example, consider two stores: each with 30 organic 
product SKUs. One store has a private-label product ratio of 35% while the other has a 
private-label ratio of 45% (see Figure 2.4). When both stores increase their organic 
product SKUs from 30 to 60, we can see that the number of conventional product SKUs 
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in the second store decreases. This is because retail stores would prioritize both organic 
products and their store brands over branded conventional products. We discuss this 
effect further in Section 2.6.5.  
Table 2.5: Instrumental Variable Regression 
  (13) (14) (15) 
Variable Names ConVar ConVar ConVar 
OrgVar 0.9708*** 1.6628*** 23.519*** 
 (0.1096) (0.1923) (1.1632) 
OrgVar*PriLabel  -3.9745***  
  (0.7939)  
PriLabel -111.81*** -81.232*** -126.46*** 
 (7.6247) (9.8355) (7.9874) 
OrgVar*HHI   -2.8761*** 
   (0.1453) 
HHI -4.7025* -5.6601** 15.479*** 
 (2.4093) (2.4006) (1.9414) 
StoRev 1.3859*** 1.2929*** 0.8366* 
 (0.4484) (0.4347) (0.4512) 
DiscountShare -0.8681** -0.8386* -0.3684 
 (0.4396) (0.4348) (0.3896) 
AdShare 0.6611 0.3881 1.4267** 
 (0.6404) (0.6345) (0.6433) 
    
Observations 307,688 307,688 307,688 
R-squared 0.119 0.138 0.173 
Number of Store 1,887 1,887 1,887 
Store FE YES YES YES 
Week Dummy YES YES YES 
Notes. * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. Clustered Robust Standard errors in parenthesis. 
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            Figure 2.3: The Marginal Effect of Organic Variety 
            When Private-label Ratio Increases 
 
 
                    Figure 2.4: The Moderating Effect of Private-label 
        Table 2.5, Result (15), shows a negative coefficient (β3= -2.8761, p < .01) of the 
interaction term between organic product variety and retail-chain HHI. When the revenue 
of a retail chain is highly concentrated with a few manufacturers, the manufacturers have 
more power on deciding a store’s SKU offerings. As a result, retail chains offer fewer 
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conventional product SKUs when introducing organic product SKUs, and manufacturers 
save on operating costs by managing fewer SKUs. On the other hand, when a retail chain 
is less concentrated, the retailers have more power deciding on their product variety 
offerings. They choose to offer more SKUs to attract more customers and generate higher 
revenue. Again, to illustrate this finding graphically, we plot the marginal effects of 
organic product variety when the HHI increases. As shown in Figure 2.5, when the HHI 
increases, the marginal effect of organic product variety decreases. The average marginal 
effect of organic product variety becomes negative when HHI is higher than 8.17 (i.e., 
23.519-2.8761 *HHI= 0 and HHI= 8.17). 
 
 
      Figure 2.5: The Marginal Effect of Organic Variety When HHI Increases 
 
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
E
ff
ec
ts
 o
n
 L
in
ea
r 
P
re
d
ic
ti
o
n
7.2 7.4 7.6 7.8 8 8.2 8.4 8.6 8.8 9 9.2
Chain HHI
Average Marginal Effects of Organic Variety with 95% CIs
 
50 
 
    Figure 2.6: The Marginal Effect of Organic Variety When Store Size Increases 
 
2.6.3. STORE SIZE AS A CONSTRAINT 
        We have showed that conventional product variety is positively associated with 
organic product variety, which supports the notion of a stronger market-expansion effect 
of organic product growth rather than a cost-efficiency effect. However, the market 
expansion effect is not necessarily in conflict with the cost-efficiency effect. In fact, the 
cost-efficiency effect becomes dominant when capacity constraints are sufficiently tight, 
in which case organic product and conventional product variety cannot continue to grow 
at the same time. Given the limited shelf space available to display yogurt, smaller stores 
are constrained by the number of SKUs (organic or conventional) that they can carry on 
their shelves. Larger stores have more space and therefore have more flexibility in adding 
SKUs. The previous analysis controls for store revenue as a proxy for store size or 
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capacity. The positive relationship between organic product and conventional product 
variety, however, may be an artifact of our dataset having a large number of stores that 
are less constrained for capacity. In order to further examine the relationship between 
organic product and conventional product variety under capacity constraints, we consider 
an interaction term between store annual revenue (StoRev) and organic product variety 
(OrgVar). We recognize that store revenue is not a perfect measure for store size. 
However, we believe that larger stores generally would have higher revenues than 
smaller stores. We start our analysis using the full sample and use store annual revenue 
(StoRev) as a proxy for shelf space. Again, as in section 2.6.1, we use the same two 
instruments for the two potentially endogenous variables, and we employ 2SLS 
estimation. Result (16) of Table 2.6 shows the full sample coefficients. However, the 
interaction coefficient (β3= 0.018, p = .27) is only qualitatively positive. One scenario 
that compromises the relationship between store size and revenue is market size and 
demand. For example, a smaller store located in a high population density area may have 
greater annual revenue than a larger store located in a low population density area. To 
alleviate this concern, we develop a subsample with similar market sizes to reduce the 
impact of differences in store traffic. Specifically, we identify the five most populated 
areas in our dataset: New York, Philadelphia, Washington, D.C., Chicago, and Los 
Angeles. The sizes of these markets are comparable. The results from the first subsample 
are compared with those from the full sample, and are shown in Results (17) of Table 6. 
We find that the interaction term (β3= 0.01625, p < .1) is positively correlated with 
conventional yogurt variety. To illustrate it graphically, we plot the marginal effects of 
organic product variety as store revenue increases. As shown in Figure 2.6, when store 
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revenue increases, the average marginal effect of organic product variety also increases. 
Finally, we also develop subsamples based on store revenue, with the bottom 5% of 
stores. In the bottom 5% stores, there are 178 stores with an average annual revenue of 
2.52 (million $), ranging from 0.11 to 3.35 (million $). We use 2SLS estimation to 
analyze the impact of organic product variety on conventional product variety. Table 7, 
results (18) show the correlation (β1= -1.118, p < .01) is negative. We also perform 
similar analysis for our diff-in-diff sample where we kept only bottom 5% of treatment 
stores (3 treatment stores) with all control stores and use diff-in-diff analysis with 
propensity score matching. Table 2.7, results (19) show that the interaction term between 
Treat and After is negative, which is consistent with the instrument variables estimation. 
Together, these findings indicate that smaller stores have significant space constraints 
that would not allow them to increase conventional product variety. These results 
reconcile our main result finding a positive relationship between organic product variety 
and conventional product variety with the more conventional, capacity-based 
cannibalization argument.  
2.6.4. BRANDED CONVENTIONAL PRODUCT VARIETY VS. PRIVATE-LABEL CONVENTIONAL 
PRODUCT VARIETY  
        Previously, we had shown that conventional yogurt variety decreases as organic 
yogurt variety increases in stores that have a strong presence of private-label products. In 
this section, we perform two additional analyses to further examine this relationship. In 
particular, we generate two variables: BrdConVarit and PriConVarit. 
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Table 2.6: Five largest markets versus full sample 
  (16) (17) 
Variable Names ConVar ConVar 
OrgVar 0.4411 0.7675 
 (0.4695) (0.4752) 
OrgVar*StoRev 0.01800 0.01625* 
 (0.01646) (0.008394) 
PlRatio -110.68*** -112.14** 
 (24.144) (49.865) 
HHI -4.9663 -1.4389 
 (18.073) (22.090) 
DiscountShare -0.8172 0.4950 
 (1.4863) (2.3335) 
AdShare 0.6305 -3.4741 
 (2.4297) (2.1412) 
StoRev 0.8109 3.8301 
 (0.8869) (5.1476) 
Observations 307,688 85,009 
R-squared 0.124 0.087 
Number of iri_key 1,887 537 
Store/Week FE YES YES 
Notes. * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. Clustered Robust Standard errors in parenthesis. 
 
Table 2.7: Bottom 5% Store Size 
  (18) (19) 
Variable Names ConVar ConVar 
OrgVar -1.118***  
 (0.0983)  
Treat*After  -1.850*** 
  (0.275) 
HHI -0.164* -0.614 
 (0.0856) (0.319) 
PlRatio 5.078*** 9.785*** 
 (0.348) (0.239) 
StoRev 1.074 -2.229 
 (0.702) (6.680) 
Observations 15,917 20,175 
R-squared 0.299 0.087 
Number of iri_key 187 142 
Store FE YES YES 
Week Dummy YES YES 
(Some Control Variables Are Omitted for Brevity) 
Notes. * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. Clustered Robust Standard errors in parenthesis. 
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        The former represents the number of branded conventional product variety that store 
i carries at week t, and the latter represents the number of private-label conventional 
product variety that store i carries at week t. We estimate these two additional analyses 
using Model (6) and change the dependent variable to BrdConVarit and PriConVarit, 
accordingly. The results are shown in Table 2.8 (Results (20) and (21), respectively). In 
Result (20), we can see that the interaction term between organic product variety and 
private-label ratio, β3= -7.773 (p < .01), is negative. Thus, the private-label ratio 
negatively moderates the correlation between organic product variety and branded 
conventional product variety. The total effect of organic product variety on branded 
conventional product variety in stores that hold private-label product is β1+β3 * 
PrivateLabelit. When the private-label variety ratio is less than 28.2% (i.e., 2.194-7.773 * 
PrivateLabelit = 0, and PrivateLabelit = 0.282), additional organic product variety would 
increase branded conventional product variety in the store. However, if the private-label 
variety ratio is greater than 28.2%, increasing organic product variety would lead to a 
decrease in branded conventional product variety. However, in Result (21), we see a 
different effect on private-label conventional yogurt. The interaction term between 
organic product variety and the private-label ratio, β_3= 2.158 (p < .01), is positive. 
Thus, the private-label ratio positively moderates the correlation between organic product 
variety and private-label conventional product variety. The total effect of organic product 
variety on branded conventional product variety in stores that hold private-label product 
is β1+β3 * PrivateLabelit. When the private-label variety ratio is higher than 9.4% (i.e., -
0.203+2.158 * PrivateLabelit = 0 and PrivateLabelit = 0.094), additional organic product 
variety would increase private-label conventional product variety in the store. And only 
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when the private-label variety ratio is less than 9.4%, additional organic product variety 
would decrease private-label conventional product variety in the store. These additional 
analyses point to the fact that retailers with strong private-label presence tend to reduce 
branded conventional product variety when increasing organic product variety. 
Table 2.8: Private or Branded Conventional Variety 
  (20) (21) 
Variables BrdConVar PriConVar 
      
OrgVar 2.1937*** -0.2033*** 
 (0.384) (0.065) 
OrgVar*PriLabel -7.7725*** 2.1577*** 
 (2.071) (0.408) 
PriLabel -165.31*** 66.610*** 
 (20.199) (14.368) 
DiscountShare -1.7408 0.2490 
 (1.943) (0.554) 
AdShare 8.615e-04*** 1.081e-04* 
 (2.945e-04) (6.197e-05) 
StoRev 1.2197** 0.01947 
 (0.108) (0.104) 
   
Observations 246,659 246,659 
R-squared 0.279 0.378 
Number of Store 1,540 1,540 
Store FE YES YES 
Time FE YES YES 
Notes. * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. Clustered Robust Standard errors in parenthesis. 
 
 
2.6.5. GREEK YOGURT AND ALL-NATURAL YOGURT SUBCATEGORIES 
        Another concern associated with our results is that, instead of organic products, 
there may be other trendy products that spike conventional product variety in our study 
period. In this section, we aim to rule out such a possibility. During our time period of 
study, the rapid growth of organic yogurt coincided with the launch and soaring 
popularity of Greek yogurt and All-Natural yogurt. The varieties of these two 
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subcategories increased significantly during the same time. A natural possibility could be 
that if Greek yogurt and All-Natural yogurt are mostly conventional products, then the 
increase in conventional yogurt variety might be a result associated with the popularity of 
these two subcategories, rather than because of the increase in organic yogurt variety. To 
rule out this alternative explanation, we control for product variety of these two 
subcategories, and re-estimate the previous models. Because Greek yogurt and All-
Natural yogurt are available as conventional and organic yogurts, we use the number of 
organic yogurt SKUs, excluding those for Greek yogurt and All-Natural yogurt to avoid 
multicollinearity issues (see Equations (2.9) and (2.10), respectively). The results are 
given in Table 2.9 (see Results (22) and (23)). We find that after controlling for the 
variety of these subcategories, organic product variety is still positively associated with 
conventional product variety (β1= 0.657, p < .01 and γ1= 1.047, p < .01). We further find 
that the effect size of Non-Greek organic yogurt is 0.058, indicating that conventional 
yogurt variety increases 0.058% when Non-Greek organic yogurt variety increases 1%. 
Similarly, the effect size of Non-Natural organic yogurt is 0.097, indicating that 
conventional yogurt variety increases 0.097% when Non-Natural organic yogurt variety 
increases 1%.   
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑂𝑟𝑔𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐺𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐺𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝝈𝑿𝒊𝒕 + 𝜆𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡                     (2.9) 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝑂𝑟𝑔𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾3𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝝈𝑿𝒊𝒕 + 𝜆𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡   (2.10) 
        These results indicate that while the emergence of new yogurt categories contributes 
to the increase in conventional product variety, the positive relationship between organic 
and conventional product variety remains significant. 
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Table 2.9: Alternative Explanation: Greek Yogurt and All-Natural Yogurt 
  (22) (23) 
Variables ConVar ConVar 
OrgNonGreekVar  0.657***  
 (0.131)  
GreekVar 1.002***  
 (0.078)  
OrgNonNaturalVar  1.047*** 
  (0.124) 
NaturalVar  0.547* 
  (0.323) 
Observations 307,697 307,697 
R-squared 0.658 0.519 
Number of Store 1,896 1,896 
Store FE YES YES 
Week Dummy YES YES 
(Some Control Variables Are Omitted for Brevity) 
Notes. * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. Clustered Robust Standard errors in parenthesis. 
 
2.6.6. DOES HIGHER PRODUCT VARIETY LEAD TO GREATER SALES? 
        While our main analysis provides solid support for our main results, it does not 
address the possibility that the increases in product variety may not be accompanied by 
increases in sales. In such case, the pie is indeed larger, but it is also thinner because 
larger number of customers may not result in additional sales. To test this, we focus on 
the category revenue of yogurt products. Category revenue has been studied in the past 
literature (e.g., Perdikaki et al., 2012). Note that changes in yogurt revenue may be driven 
by the potential upward trend in consumer demand for yogurt products, which is 
measured by the per capita consumption of yogurt (YPCC) . We control for this trend 
using the per capita consumption of yogurt (YPCC) in the United States from 2008 to 
2011 (in pounds per person, retrieved from the Statista Portal). After controlling for 
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YPCC, we test the relationship between organic product variety (and conventional 
product variety) and store-level yogurt sales. 
𝑌𝑜𝑔𝑢𝑟𝑡𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑂𝑟𝑔𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑌𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑡 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜆𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡              (2.11) 
        We present our findings in Table 2.10, Result (24). As can be gleaned from this 
table, both organic product variety (β_1= 16.67, p < .01) and conventional product 
variety (β_2= 4.009, p < .05) are positively correlated with yogurt revenue. The effect 
size of organic variety and conventional variety are 0.04 and 0.10, respectively. These 
results indicate that a 1% variety increase in organic products will lead to 0.04% increase 
in store yogurt sales, while 1% variety increase in conventional products will lead to 
0.1% increase in store yogurt sales. 
 
Table 2.10: Store Traffic Extension  
  (24) 
Variables YogurtRevenue 
ConVar 4.009** 
 (1.617) 
OrgVar 16.67*** 
 (3.628) 
YPCC 66.16 
 (61.948) 
Observations 206,719 
Number of Store 1,263 
R-squared 0.926 
Store FE YES 
Week Dummy YES 
(Some Control Variables Are Omitted for Brevity) 
Notes. * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. Clustered Robust Standard errors in parenthesis. 
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2.7. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
        In this study, we seek to address two questions: (1) Does conventional product 
variety increase or decrease when organic product is introduced (or organic product 
variety increases)? (2) Does the control of assortment decisions in the supply chain affect 
assortments between organic and conventional products? Our findings show that 
introducing organic products will result in an increase of conventional product variety. 
This positive relationship between organic product introduction and conventional product 
variety is largely attributed to the growing segment of organic product consumers. These 
organic product customers are not only drawn to stores that start introducing or 
increasing their existing organic product offerings, but they will also likely purchase 
conventional products that are attractive to them during their shopping trips. It is also 
important to note that an increase in conventional product variety is not indefinite. Our 
main finding suggests that the market expansion effect of organic products largely 
outweighs the increases in operational costs for average retailers. However, we also show 
that stores that face limited shelf-space resources tend to reduce conventional product 
variety to make room for organic products when they introduce or expand their organic 
product offerings. This is consistent with the literature that suggests that product 
assortment is constrained by the space available in stores (Corstjens & Doyle, 1981). 
        Extending our findings to include the supply chain relationship effects, we also find 
that when manufacturers are more concentrated, and therefore more powerful in the 
supply chain and have control over product assortment decisions, stores tend to have a 
less positive relationship between organic product and conventional product variety. This 
finding supports the theoretical result that powerful manufacturers may strategically 
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reduce product variety to reduce costs (Inderst & Shaffer 2007). Similarly, when retailers 
are more powerful with a strong private-label presence (Dunne & Narasimhan, 1999; 
Narasimhan & Wilcox, 1998; Quelch & Harding, 1996), they tend to reduce branded 
conventional products and increase private-label conventional products when introducing 
organic products. This suggests that retailers further leverage their store brands and 
supply chain control in their assortment decisions, leading to asymmetric effects of 
organic products on conventional product variety. Taken together, these findings suggest 
that retailers tend to increase conventional product offerings with the introduction of 
organic products, as long as they have enough capacity and have control over the supply 
chain. 
2.7.1. THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS       
        Retail store operations face a variety of novel challenges and complexities (Mou et 
al., 2018). Our research contributes to the product assortment literature by empirically 
examining the impact of an emerging product type—organic products—on retailer 
product assortment decisions. Increasing product variety generally has two effects on 
retail operations. On the one hand, there is the revenue effect from better market 
segmentation, by attracting new and variety seeking consumers (Bayus & Putsis, 1999; 
Ton & Raman, 2010; Xia & Rajagopalan, 2009). However, retailers should also be aware 
of the cannibalization effects as product variety increases (Quelch & Kenny, 1994). This 
happens when a product in a certain category may cannibalize consumer demand of 
another product in the same category. Our results indicate that, organic products, thanks 
to their specialized group of customers, stimulate the demand for a variety of 
conventional products within the same category. Therefore, introducing and increasing 
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organic product offerings are different from traditional decisions pertaining to product 
line extensions. On the other hand, there is the cost effect associated with operations  
increasing product variety (Mantrala et al., 2009; Shockley et al., 2015). We also confirm 
that the cost effect is significant when retailers face strict shelf space constraints, as well 
as when the market expansion effect is subject to capacity constraints (Hamilton & 
Richards, 2009).  
        In addition, manufacturers bear much higher cost from increasing product variety 
compared to retailers (Kekre & Srinivasan, 1990; Fisher & Ittner, 1999), and in 
particular, with respect to organic products (Chang & Schuster, 2002). Therefore, as 
organic products continue to gain momentum in the market, the governance and control 
in the organic product supply chain become more important for retailer assortment 
decisions. We contribute to the literature by empirically examining the effect of organic 
supply chain governance and control on retailer-manufacturer product assortment 
decisions. In particular, we consider supply chains that contain a concentrated group of 
manufacturers or a retailer with strong private-label presence. We show that these two 
mechanisms lead to different results for conventional product variety. With a smaller, 
concentrated manufacturer group, the retailer has less power and control over product 
assortment decisions. We show that a manufacturer’s concerns of cost efficiency 
associated with organic products have a stronger effect on retailer assortment decisions, 
thereby mitigating the market expansion effect for manufacturer brands. Moreover, we 
show that retailers with a strong private-label presence may leverage the pattern of 
expansion of organic product variety as an opportunity to increase their private-label 
conventional products and reduce their reliance on national brand conventional product 
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variety. Prior research on private-label products mostly focuses on product and service 
quality, customer loyalty, store differentiation, and store profitability in the context of 
supply chain governance and control (Ailawadi et al., 2008; Chintagunta et al., 2002; 
Corstjens & Lal, 2000; Martos-Partal & González-Benito, 2011). In contrast, we 
empirically show that private-label products also play a role in supply chain relationship 
through the retailers’ assortment planning decisions. Our finding of retailers switching 
national brand conventional products with private-label products when introducing 
organic products is consistent with other studies. For example, Alan et al. (2017), found 
that retailers would protect their private-label products by reducing competing national 
branded product assortments. We build further on Alan et al.’s (2017) work by showing 
that retailers will strategically use organic product expansion as an opportunity to 
strengthen their private-label product portfolio as well. Taken together, these findings 
suggest that the growth of organic products is demand-driven and motivated by an 
increasing variety-seeking customer base, which stimulates an assortment involving a 
higher variety of conventional product offerings. However, the supply-driven constraints 
and cost implications in the supply chain significantly affect this relationship as well. 
This is true especially when manufacturers have more power to influence product 
assortment decisions. 
2.7.2. MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS       
        In addition to the contributions to theory, this study has managerial implications as 
well. For retailers that have not yet launched organic products on their shelves, this study 
points to the benefit of overall store sales from the introduction of organic products. 
Retailers could use organic products to attract new variety-seeking consumers, who could 
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also buy conventional products as well. This way stores are also encouraged to add 
variety for conventional products also. Increasing both organic product variety and 
conventional variety will result in higher category level sales. To be more specific, our 
results show that a 1% increase in organic product variety could lead to a 0.04% increase 
in total category sales. Similarly, by increasing conventional product variety by 1% 
would lead to a 0.1% increase in total category sales. As the contingent nature of our 
findings indicate, it is not a “free lunch,” that is, there is a tapering off effect of further 
increasing product variety. First, the limited shelf space may limit retailers’ ability to 
further increase total product variety. In such cases, retailers will have to switch some of 
their low-performing conventional products with organic products. Another constraint 
comes from the supplier side: a concentrated supplier base also hinders retailers from 
increasing total product variety. Because increasing product variety increases costs for 
manufacturers more than for retailers, such factors should be carefully considered when 
deciding on the optimal mix of organic product variety in comparison to variety of 
conventional products. On the flip side, if retailers face adverse power from 
manufacturers, they can respond by introducing private-label brands. Because private-
label products help retailers gain customer loyalty, introducing private-label products 
would enhance retailers’ power in the supply chain. In addition, retailers that already 
have private-label products can further enhance their power in the supply chain by 
substituting national brand conventional products with private-label conventional 
products as they attempt to increase organic product variety. As a result, retailers could 
introduce their private-label products to the newly acquired organic product customers 
and gain loyalty from these organic product customers. Viewed from a manufacturer’s 
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perspective, by facing the growing pressure of supplying organic products and meeting 
retailers’ demand for more variety in conventional products, manufacturers should invest 
in clear product differentiation of their national brands (for organic and conventional 
products) so that customers can be wooed away from the retail stores’ organic or private-
label brands. In addition, since producing both conventional products and organic 
products may be costly, manufacturers could consider mergers and acquisitions with 
small organic product producers, thereby increasing their overall product portfolios.  
2.7.3. LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH       
        Our study is not without limitations. First, we should note that organic consumers 
also purchasing conventional products may be driven by the fact that organic product 
supply is still limited. Therefore, many product variants are available only in 
conventional product forms. As organic production gets more generalized, organic 
consumers may become more exclusive in their purchasing patterns of organic products. 
If this is the case, we may see a decrease in the positive correlation between organic 
product and conventional product variety in the future. However, as the supply of organic 
products is still very limited today, we do not expect such effects to diminish in the near 
future. Second, we did not have a precise measure for shelf space. Although using store 
revenue is a reasonable proxy for shelf space, future research could use actual shelf space 
data to understand to what extent shelf space constrains the growth of conventional 
products. Third, we use only yogurt data to study the effects of organic product growth 
on conventional products due to the limitation of our data source. As organic products 
become less expensive to consumers, future research could use more product categories 
and see if the balance between product expansion and cost efficiency is different across 
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product categories. Fourth, our sample is limited to the United States of America. 
European countries have a slightly more mature organic market, while Asian countries 
have just begun to introduce organic products into the retail market in a formal manner. 
Future research with data from different countries and regions may provide richer 
insights into how organic products perform differently across global regions. Finally, we 
did not have data on all organic product manufacturers and the unmasked names (real 
identities) for the retail chains. Future research conducted with additional identity related 
information may provide valuable contextual insights on how different manufacturers and 
retailers react to the growth in organic products. 
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CHAPTER 3 
HOW DO CONSUMERS CHOOSE BETWEEN ORGANIC PRODUCTS 
AND MULTIPLE PRODUCT ATTRIBUTES? AN EMPIRICAL STUDY 
OF YOGURT SALES 
ABSTRACT 
        The rapid growth in organic product variety poses challenges for retailers to manage 
their assortment mix. Although organic consumers are willing to pay a higher price for 
organic products, more and more evidence shows that organic consumers are also price-
sensitive. In addition, when choosing between organic and conventional products, 
consumers face a much more complex decision that involves product brand, style, and 
other specific product attributes than a binary choice between organic and conventional 
product types. However, an in-depth understanding of how consumers make such 
complex decisions involving organic and other product attributes is missing. In this study, 
we use scanner panel data from retailers across the united states to examine how 
customers evaluate organic products when there are a large number of other product 
attributes present at the same time. In particular, we estimate own-price and cross-price 
elasticities under different nesting options. Our findings suggest that organic condition, 
product style, and seller attributes are all highly influential in shaping consumers’ 
purchasing decisions. Further, the relationship between organic and conventional 
products is much more nuanced and context-specific than previously shown. Counter-
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intuitively, we find products that are most appealing to health-conscious consumers are 
also the ones that are most prone to price changes. Through this finding, we are able to 
provide insights to retailers that offer both organic and conventional products on how to 
manage their assortment mix. 
Keywords: Organic Products, Choice Modeling  
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
        In the last decade, the U.S. organic market has more than doubled in size (Organic 
Trade Association, 2018; see Figure 1.1). Driven by the growing number of health-
conscious consumers, conventional grocers have significantly increased their assortment 
of organic products in recent years . As a result, retailing organic food changed as 
traditional purveyors of organic food faced increased competition from companies new to 
the sector, with organic food sold not only in natural-products stores, such as Whole 
Foods and food cooperatives, but also in traditional supermarkets such as Safeway, big-
box stores such as Wal-Mart, and club stores such as Costco (Dimitri & Oberholtzer, 
2009). 
        Although organic products are typically priced higher than their conventional 
counterparts, sales of organic products and especially organic produce are booming. The 
organic premiums, defined as “the price difference between the organic and the 
nonorganic price of an item when factors such as the type of store sold, time of year and 
geographic location are the same” (ERS, 2016), ranged from 7 percent for fresh spinach 
to 60 percent for salad mix. This premium does not necessarily deter sales. For example, 
17 percent of people who purchase organic at least sometimes were willing to pay up to 
35 percent more for organic vegetables, and 27 percent were willing to pay 20 to 34 
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percent more (The Hartman Group. 2016 ). It is believed that organic consumers are 
much less price-sensitive (Enneking, 2002; Mondelaers et al., 2008) than non-buyers. 
However, recent studies suggest that although the “hardcore” organic consumers may be 
less price-sensitive, the majority of organic consumers do care about organic pricing. A 
2009 study by the Hartman Group found that there are three key consumer demographics: 
While 21% of the total consumers buy organic products exclusively, 65% of the total 
consumers buy both organic products and conventional products. The “occasional” 
organic consumers bring both opportunities and challenges to conventional supermarkets. 
On the one hand, carrying non-organic (we refer it as “conventional” hereafter) products 
may reduce the loss of sales when a specific organic product is not available. On the 
other hand, retailers should also beware of low-margin conventional products cannibalize 
the sales of high-margin organic products. Therefore, it is important to understand how 
consumers choose between organic and conventional products and how much does 
conventional products cannibalize the sales of organic products. Especially for those 
retailers who carry both types of products. 
        Along with the rapid growth of organic products, new product features have also 
emerged and prospered. For example, Greek yogurt, no matter organic or conventional, 
who has a total of $60 million market in the United States back in 2005 turns $1.5 Billion 
in 2011 . As new products and product features emerge almost every day, grocery stores 
today carry 40,000 more items than they did in the 1990s (Malito, 2017). The rapid 
growth of product variety has significantly increased operational costs such as inventory 
and out-of-stock costs. What makes the matter more urgent is that for most of the grocery 
stores, the shelf space does not grow concomitantly with increasing product variety. 
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Because growth in total product variety spikes operating costs and increases the 
possibility of stock-outs, which ultimately hurts retailers’ profits (Alfaro & Corbett, 
2003; Fisher & Ittner, 1999; Shockley et al., 2015; Ton & Raman, 2010). This is 
especially a concern for stores that have tighter space constraints, such as stores located 
in urban areas and convenience stores. In addition, such capacity constraints have become 
more prominent because of shrinking store sizes: on average, newly opened stores are 
about 25 percent smaller than existing stores (McKinsey & Company, 2013). Therefore, 
it is challenging for retailers to choose the correct organic and conventional product mix 
when increasing their organic product offerings. Although how organic assortment, price, 
and promotions drive retailer performance has been studied in previous work, an in-depth 
understanding of how consumers make complex purchase decisions involving organic 
products among numerous other non-organic related attributes is missing. In this study, 
we seek to find how consumers would make their purchase decisions when facing such 
complex choices and what is the best assortment mix for retailers that carry both organic 
products and conventional products.  
        We examine the following research questions: (1) How consumers evaluate organic 
products when there are multiple features and attributes of the organic product, and 
directly evaluate the cannibalization effect of conventional products on organic products. 
(2) What is the best assortment mix for retailers who sell both organic and conventional 
products? Specifically, we examine the relative effect of product attributes (price, brand, 
nutrition information, style, etc.) and seller-related attributes (store type, store size, 
promotion, advertising, etc.) on consumers’ choices for organic products. We focus our 
study on sales of yogurts for several reasons. First of all, both organic yogurts and 
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conventional yogurts experience rapid growth in both sales and the richness of product 
features. The strong performance in yogurt industry leads to an explosion of product 
variety, therefore retailers must carefully choose the products to carry on the shelf. 
Second, unlike most of the packaged consumer goods, yogurts typically have a relatively 
short shelf life (about 3 weeks) and have to be stored in the refrigerated area. Therefore, 
anything that does not sell at the end of the shelf life would be a waste of both money and 
the precious shelf space. Third, yogurts are often on price promotions, and consumers are 
likely to purchase the products on sale. The increase of sales in promotional items and the 
decrease of sales in non-promotional items make retailers difficult to evaluate the effect 
of the promotions. Therefore, retailers need a better understanding of the substitutional 
effects on the products they carry.   
        We use four years (2008-2011) of weekly scanner data obtained from Information 
Resources Inc. (IRi) and employ structural estimation techniques developed in the 
empirical industrial organization literature to conduct our analysis (Berry 1994). This 
analysis method allows us to better understand why a consumer makes a particular choice 
and how the consumer analyzes trade-offs among the attributes of the choices.  
        Our research contributes to the operations management literature as follows. 
Although organic products have been perceived as having a better quality, taste, and 
healthier in terms of pesticide residue than its conventional counterparts, the direct 
competition between organic products and their conventional counterparts has received 
little attention. Our study builds on a recent stream of work exploring how price and 
marketing actions (Ngobo, 2011; Bezawada & Pauwels, 2013) influence consumers’ 
attitudes and willingness to pay for organic products. However, most papers in this 
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stream assume consumers face a simple binary choice: an organic product or a 
conventional product. They also assume consumers have no preference for all other 
choices within the same product category. In practice, however, consumers’ preferences 
for organic products and conventional products may also be influenced by product brand, 
style, and other attributes. Additionally, consumers may choose where to shop such as a 
bigger retailer or a small convenience store. Overall, our study includes a much broader 
choice set than those represented in previous studies. And we also account for consumers 
may have a certain preference for what types or brands of products they would like. By 
analyzing the relative effects of the noted product and seller-related variables on 
consumers’ choices, we extend the previous literature by conducting a more direct 
examination of the cannibalization effect between organic products and conventional 
products.  
3.2. LITERATURE REVIEW  
        In this section, we review the literature from two related streams of research: what 
are the key factors for consumers to choose from organic or conventional products and 
choice modeling techniques in operations management literature.  
3.2.1 HOW CONSUMERS CHOOSE BETWEEN ORGANIC AND CONVENTIONAL PRODUCTS 
        Organic product sales have increased from $3.6 billion in 1997 to $47 billion in 
2016 (Organic Trade Association, 2016). Consumers value organic food because it is 
seen as being healthier, more nutritious, better tasting, and safer because no chemicals are 
used in its production (Bauer et al., 2013). According to anecdotal evidence, consumers 
often purchase organic produce according to the “dirty dozen and clean fifteen” 
standards, which identify groceries with the most pesticide residue and those with the 
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least contamination (Pou, 2010). Currently, consumers in the United States buy more 
organic products in traditional supermarkets than in other outlets . Meanwhile, traditional 
supermarkets are increasingly promoting organic products through various in-store 
marketing programs (e.g., increasing variety, displays). Because organics have higher 
gross margins, 30% to 50% versus 20% to 25% for conventional products (Oberholtzer et 
al., 2006), promoting organic products would enhance total category profits and store 
revenues (Bezawada & Pauwels, 2013).  
        The growing segment of organic consumers is usually associated with higher 
disposable income, higher education, and lower price sensitivity (Krystallis et al., 2006). 
More recent studies start to find that this growing segment of consumers does not 
exclusively buy organic: a 2009 study by the Hartman Group found that, while 21% of 
consumers buy organic only, 65% of consumers buy both conventional and organic 
products (Chait, 2017). Evidence shows that organic customers also purchase 
conventional products if they find them attractive, particularly when the prices of organic 
products are too high or when the supply of organic products is limited (Hudson, 2012). 
However, there has not been much study to investigate exactly how much does organic 
customers care about product price or promotions, and how do customers choose between 
the two broad product categories. Not to mention how do consumers choose among all 
the different products and facing much more complex choices than choosing only 
between organic and conventional products.  
        A handful of studies used revealed data (typically scanner panel) to analyze how 
organic consumers react to retail prices, and they have mixed findings. Glaser and 
Thompson (2000) report large own-price elasticity (between –3.63 and –9.73) for U.S. 
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organic milk in the late 1990s. They also find the cross-price elasticity suggests that 
organic and branded conventional milk are substitutes. However, the substitution 
response is asymmetry where change in organic milk has little effect on conventional 
branded milk whereas change in conventional branded milk has a great effect on organic 
milk. In contrast, Kiesel and Villas-Boas (2007) report small price elasticity (between –
.001 and –.003) for U.S. organic milk in the 2000s. By study data from Europe, Ngobo 
(2011) concludes that organic products may be a poor fit for traditional marketing actions 
such as price reduction and a higher variety. However, using United States data, 
Bezawada and Pauwels (2013) find that enduring actions, such as assortment and regular 
price changes, have a higher elasticity for organics than for conventional products. That 
is, in contrast with common wisdom, even “core” organic consumers are sensitive to 
these actions. 
        The extant literature does not, however, provide a clear understanding of how other 
product-related (style, brand, nutrition, etc.) and seller-related factors influence 
consumers’ preferences when choosing between organic products and conventional 
products. In addition, all of the studies mentioned above do not assume consumers may 
have a certain preference for how they choose to buy their products. In practice, however, 
consumers may first select a style than select whether to buy an organic product within 
that style, or they may first decide whether to buy an organic product or a conventional 
one than select a style later. Our study accounts for such consumer preferences by using 
conditional nested models, therefore, we help fill this gap in the literature by using 
revealed purchase data to calculate cross-price elasticities between product organic status 
and styles.  
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3.2.2. CHOICE MODELING TECHNIQUES IN OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT LITERATURE 
        Capturing and understanding consumer choice behavior has become more and more 
important to business managers (Garrow 2016). As the increase in product options in 
retail markets has significantly expanded the number of options that are available to 
consumers (Ton & Raman, 2010). Choice models, which allow researchers to understand 
how a consumer evaluates the attributes of alternatives within a product category, are one 
approach to studying consumer choices. The discrete-choice demand model stemming 
from McFadden (1978) and Manski and McFadden’s (1981) random utility framework is 
a widely-leveraged approach to understand consumer choices. The discrete-choice 
demand model was intended to provide an appropriate framework for the empirical 
analysis of choice among finite sets of alternatives, with each alternative characterized as 
a bundle of attributes (Manski, 2001). McFadden (1978) supposed that each member of a 
population of interest faces a finite choice set and selects an alternative that maximizes 
his/her utility. Further, the model assumes that the purchase decisions of consumers are 
affected by the selection of products that a seller offers. In the field of operations 
management, choice modeling techniques have been used in a wide range of research 
contexts. In retail operations, for example, researchers have used these methods to assist 
with assortment planning (Rusmevichientong et al., 2010; Kok and Xu 2011; Li and Huh, 
2011; Rusmevichientong & Topaloglu, 2012). To perform our analyses, we leverage the 
structural estimation technique introduced by Berry (1994) which allows for the 
development of models of demand and supply equations. The Berry (1994) and Berry et 
al., (1995) models were one of the first methods to estimate demand based on random 
utility maximization (RUM) models, using aggregate market-level sales data. In the 
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recent Operations literature, the Berry structural estimation model has been employed by 
Nevo (2001) to estimate the price margin in the ready-to-eat cereal industry, Allon et al., 
(2011) to estimate the value of reducing customer wait times in the drive-thru fast-food 
industry, Guajardo et al., (2016) to examine how various product and service attributes 
affect demand for US automobiles and McKie et al., (2018) to examine how consumers’ 
choices for different generation and conditions of iPads are affected by seller and product 
attributes on eBay. Similarly, we leverage the model to understand how consumers’ 
choices for organic and conventional yogurts are affected by market and product-related 
variables. 
        The Berry model distinctively assumes prices are endogenously determined by 
firms., while most of the existing empirical literature on this topic assumes prices are 
exogenous. The exogenous assumption has been noted as a significant limitation in the 
literature (Berry 1994, Guajardo et al., 2016). Therefore, we follow Guajardo et al., 
(2016) and Mckie et al., (2018), to develop instrumental variables for the price and nested 
market share, using the sum of the other observations’ characteristics (see section 3.4.2). 
Thus, similar to Guajardo et al., (2016) and McKie et al., (2018), from a methodological 
perspective we extend the previous research on this topic through directly controlling for 
the endogeneity of prices. 
3.3. DATA AND MEASURES 
        We first describe our data source and sample size in Section 3.3.1, and then we 
describe the dependent, independent, and control variables used in our analyses in 
Section 3.3.2.  
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3.3.1. DATA 
        We use four years of proprietary scanner data (2008-2011) from IRi, which reports 
data for grocery chains and drug stores in 50 markets in the U.S. (except Alaska and 
Hawaii). The raw data contains three files that separately report: 1) weekly Stock 
Keeping Unit (SKU) sales and unit price, 2) SKU attributes (e.g., product type, organic 
status, fat content, promotion, and product size), and 3) store information (location, chain 
affiliates, market, and store’s annual sales). An SKU is defined as a unique combination 
of brand, flavor, weight, container material, container size, and pack size. We first use the 
Universal Product Code (UPC) number to identify each SKU and then combine the SKU 
sales data with the SKU attributes data. We then use the store ID from both the SKU 
sales data and store information data to arrive at our final sample. We use data pertaining 
to the yogurt category to test our hypotheses for two main reasons. First of all, both 
organic yogurts and conventional yogurts experience rapid growth in both sales and the 
richness of product features. The strong performance in yogurt industry leads to an 
explosion of product variety, therefore retailers need to carefully choose the products to 
carry on shelf. For example, in our sample, the total number of varieties of yogurt in the 
US market soared 32% from 4,581 in 2008 to 6,053 in 2011. In comparison, the organic 
SKU category increased 30%, from 256 SKUs (in 2008) to 331 SKUs (in 2011). 
Moreover, we also see large number of SKUs in almost every yogurt type and style. The 
richness in yogurt variety enables us to better understand consumers’ specific preferences 
in certain product attributes. Second, unlike most of the packaged consumer goods, 
yogurts typically have a relatively short shelf life (about 3 weeks) and have to be stored 
in the refrigerated area. Therefore, anything that does not sell at the end of the shelf life 
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would be a waste of both money and the precious shelf space. Third, yogurts are often on 
price promotions, and consumers are likely to purchase the ones on sale. The increase of 
sales in promotional items and the decrease of sales in non-promotional items make 
retailers difficult to evaluate the effect of the promotions. Therefore, retailers need better 
understanding of the substitutional effects on different products they carry. The yogurt 
category in the raw data has 7,112 SKUs in total, including discontinued SKUs and 
yogurt by-products, such as almond yogurt, buffalo milk yogurt, yogurt smoothies, and 
kefir. We dropped all yogurt by-products in our study to focus on the main yogurt 
category products. Our final sample is an unbalanced panel dataset that contains 208 
weeks of data for 1,896 stores in 50 markets. Two kinds of stores are included in our 
dataset: grocery stores and drug/convenience stores. There are 1,561 grocery stores and 
335 drug/convenience stores in our final sample. Our dataset does not contain wholesale 
clubs such as Costco and Sam’s Club. Across all the stores, there are 6,053 yogurt SKUs, 
including 242 brands produced by 88 manufacturers (including private-labels). To 
address our research questions, we aggregated the raw data at the weekly store level, that 
is, we calculated the total sales of each SKU in a store i at week t. We also calculated 
other store-specific characteristics based on sales data, as described below. 
3.3.2. PRODUCT AND TRANSACTION-RELATED VARIABLES 
        We extracted all product and transaction-related information from the final data 
sample. We use the UPC code as the identification of each SKU, and extract all product-
related information from the sales data at store-week level.  
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3.3.2.1. PRICE 
        Price is one of the most important factors when consumers make purchase decisions. 
In our research settings, different yogurts have different prices and are in different 
package sizes. To standardize the price on each product, we follow Nevo (2001) to 
convert all product prices to Dollars per Pint. 
3.3.2.2. ORGANIC 
        For each SKU, there is a binary variable indicates whether the product is organic. 
We thus model Organic as a binary variable that equals 1 if the SKU is an organic 
product, and 0 if the SKU is a conventional product. 
3.3.2.3. STYLE 
        Amongst our SKU level weekly sales of 52,329,765 observations, We observe 31 
different styles in our dataset, including the most commonly observed yogurt styles such 
as Grade-A (32,300,000 observations), Greek (4,155,480 observations), Creamy 
(2,691,613 observations), All-Natural (2,336,685 observations), and some less commonly 
seen styles such as Bulgarian (2,493 observations), Kosher (335 observations). We also 
have some observations that marked style as Missing (408,631 observations). Note that 
the Grade-A yogurt style in our dataset stands for yogurts that do not specifically have a 
style (e.g. Yoplait Original, Dannon Activia, Stonyfield Farm, etc.), because according to 
USDA regulations, all yogurts made and sold in the united states must be made from 
Grade-A milk. As a result, we renamed the Grade-A yogurt style as “Regular”. And 
because there are no other styles of yogurt (except Greek, All-Natural, Creamy, and 
Regular) have more than 1,000,000 observations in our data, we combined all other styles 
including Missing and rename them as “Other” style. We thus model Style as a 
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categorical variable that equals 1 if the product style is Greek, 2 if the product style is 
All-Natural, 3 if the product style is Creamy, 4 if the product style is Regular, and 5 if the 
product style is Other. 
3.3.2.4. PRIVATE-LABEL 
        For each SKU, we also find if the product if a private-label product. We leverage 
this information because consumers may have a different preference for private-label 
products, and private-label products directly compete with national brand products 
(Ailawadi & Keller, 2004). We model Private-label as a binary variable that equals 1 if 
the product is a private-label product, and 0 if the product is a national brand. 
3.3.2.5. BRAND 
        There are 232 different brands in our dataset. As a product brand is apparently a key 
factor in consumers’ choices (Macdonald & Sharp, 2000), we model brand as a 
categorical variable that represents each different brand names.  
3.3.2.6. FAT-CONTENT 
        We also acquire the fat-content information for each product in our dataset because 
fat-content is another key factor that affects consumer choices in the dairy product 
category. There are 21 different levels of fat-content in our data. And this high variability 
is due to different brand describe their fat-content in different ways. For example, some 
brands describe their product as “1% Low Fat” whereas some other brands describe their 
product as “99% Fat-Free”. We leverage the fat-content information and create a 
categorical variable FatContent, that equals 1 to 21 to identify the fat-content on each 
product. 
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3.3.3. SELLER RELATED VARIABLES 
        There are 1896 unique sellers (stores) in our dataset. We extract several store 
attributes that may affect consumer choices when they shop at the stores. 
        TotalVatirety measures the total number of yogurt SKUs that were sold in the store i 
at week t. As indicated in the operations literature, higher variety often leads to higher 
sales because consumers are more likely to find the product they needed (Bayus & Putsis, 
1999; Xia & Rajagopalan, 2009; Ton & Raman, 2010). 
        PackageSize measures the average size of the yogurt products in the store i at week 
t. Larger stores typically have higher average product sizes, and they carry more product 
variety at a lower price than smaller stores (e.g., big-box retailers compared to small 
convenience stores), therefore consumers are more likely to find the product they needed 
and make purchases. 
        Advertisement measures the percentage of yogurt in the store that is on store 
advertisement. Although advertisement may be an effective way to increase consumer 
purchases on the advertised products, it may also reduce consumer purchases on products 
that are not on advertisement. 
        Discount measures the percentage of yogurt in the store i that is on sale at week t. 
Similar to Advertisement, a high percentage of discounted items may increase sales on the 
discounted items, but reduce the purchase of products that are not on sale.  
        In addition, the 1896 stores belong to 103 retail chains that reside in 50 metropolitan 
markets in the United States. Although the retail chain names are masked, we can still 
identify and tie each store to its retail chain in a certain market area. 
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3.3.4. AGGREGATION TECHNIQUE AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
        To prepare the data for analysis, we first segment the transactions by week and 
market. Specifically, we define 10400 (208 weeks * 50 markets) markets by geographic 
conditions and week indicators as in the dataset. Because both time and geographic 
conditions limit the options that a consumer faces when purchasing from a brick and 
mortar store. In addition, segmenting markets by time also captures factors like 
seasonality. The total sales figures were calculated from the dataset by adding up all 
yogurt sales in each market. We aggregated the data in each market by seller i. Thus, for 
each week and market, we calculated the average values for each seller (i) that sells brand 
(j), style (k), organic (l) private-label (m), and fat content (n). 
        Descriptive statistics for yogurt types and styles are presented in table 3.1 to table 
3.3. We also present descriptive statistics for relevant categorical and continuous 
variables, and related correlation tables in table 3.4 to 3.6, respectively. 
 
Table 3.1 Descriptive Statistics for Yogurt Organic Condition 
Type Observations Mean Price SD 
Conventional 47,673,234 1.5394643 1.309206 
Organic 4,656,531 2.3719485 1.411112 
 
Table 3.2 Descriptive Statistics for Yogurt Styles 
Style Observations Mean Price SD 
Greek 4,155,480 2.0869939 1.394539 
All-Natural 2,336,685 1.5532751 1.055484 
Regular 37,369,292 1.5760708 1.351474 
Creamy 4,620,210 1.6390927 1.351839 
Other 3,848,098 1.4720824 1.192319 
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Table 3.3 Descriptive Statistics for Yogurt Style-Organic 
Style-Organic Observations Mean Price SD 
Greek C 3,669,098 2.025438 1.396479 
Greek O 486,382 2.5513501 1.288286 
All-Natural C 2,102,488 1.6220092 1.089219 
All-Natural O 234,197 0.93621957 0.203318 
Regular C 35,791,981 1.5470951 1.343409 
Regular O 1,577,311 2.2335811 1.366869 
Creamy C 3,061,037 1.1779839 1.011411 
Creamy O 1,559,173 2.5443619 1.47309 
Other C 3,048,630 1.1710205 0.93052 
Other O 799,468 2.6201287 1.370132 
 
 
Table 3.4 Descriptive Statistics for Categorical Variables 
Variable Catagories Count Percentage 
Organic 0: Conventional 47,673,234 91.10% 
 1: Organic 4,656,531 8.90% 
PrivateLabel 0: National Brand 43,868,510 83.83% 
 1: Private-label 8,461,255 16.17% 
Style 1: Greek 4,155,480 7.94% 
 2: All-Natural 2,336,685 4.47% 
 3: Regular 37369292 71.41% 
 4: Creamy 4,620,210 8.83% 
 5: Other 3,848,098 7.35% 
Notes. Brand and Fat Content are omitted for abbreviation. 
 
Table 3.5 Descriptive Statistics for Continuous Variables 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Price 52,329,765 2.082268 0.8962213 0.005 159.98 
PackageSize 52,329,765 0.7997985 0.0864905 0.25 2 
Advertisement 52,329,765 0.1346979 0.1074949 0 1 
TotalVariety 52,329,765 213.6298 63.39978 1 503 
Discount 52,329,765 0.2641606 0.1493009 0 1 
StoreRevenue 52,329,765 29.69415 17.27097 0.11 146.241 
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Table 3.6 Correlation Table 
 Price 
Package 
Size Advertisement 
Total 
Variety Discount StoreRevenue Organic PrivateLabel Style 
Price 1         
PackageSize -0.1005* 1        
Advertisement -0.0198* -0.0299* 1       
TotalVariety 0.1272* -0.1312* -0.0065* 1      
Discount -0.0478* 0.0786* 0.4566* -0.0296* 1     
StoreRevenue -0.0039* 0.0877* -0.0700* 0.5183* -0.1390* 1    
Organic 0.2333* -0.0316* -0.0043* 0.1094* -0.0267* 0.0949* 1   
PrivateLabel -0.3675* 0.1119* 0.0154* -0.0904* 0.0197* -0.0100* -0.0466* 1  
Style -0.3421* -0.0054* 0.0061* -0.0567* 0.0005* 0.0043* 0.1403* 0.0517* 1 
Notes. * denotes significance at p < .05 level.
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3.4. ANALYSIS AND INITIAL RESULTS 
3.4.1. ANALYSIS 
        Choice modeling is the most natural approach for determining how consumers 
choose between different product attributes (i.e., organic or conventional) of the same 
product (Garrow, 2016). However, in our research setting, a direct application of choice 
models (such as multinomial or nested logit) is difficult as we do not know what other 
options each consumer was exposed to when they made their purchase decision. We 
leverage the Berry (1994) method for demand estimation in differentiated markets, where 
we could use aggregate sales data to estimate the impact of price and other product and 
seller characteristics on product demand. To develop the model, we first define the utility 
of an individual i purchasing product j as 
𝑈𝑖𝑗 = 𝛼𝑝𝑗 + 𝛽𝑥𝑗
′ + 𝜉𝑗 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗                                                                           (3.1) 
where pj is the average price of product j, xj' is a vector of product and seller 
characteristics (i.e., total variety, store revenue, discount level) observed by both 
researchers and consumers, ξj is a vector of characteristics (i.e., product, environmental, 
demographic, etc.) unobserved by the researchers but observed by consumers, and ϵij is 
an error term representing consumer i’s idiosyncratic preferences for product j. We 
express the aggregate utility for product j as 
𝛿𝑗 = 𝛼𝑝𝑗 + 𝛽𝑥𝑗
′ + 𝜉𝑗                                                                                                                      (3.2) 
        Using Berry’s (1994) inversion method, we derive the following non-nested model 
𝑙𝑛(𝑠𝑗) − 𝑙𝑛(𝑠0) = 𝛿𝑗 = 𝛼𝑝𝑗 + 𝛽𝑥𝑗
′ + 𝜉𝑗                                                                                                (3.3) 
where sj is the market share of product j and s0 is the market share of the outside option.  
        The outside option in the Berry (1994) formulation represents the market share of 
any alternative product that a customer is presented and considered when choosing 
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whether or not to purchase an available product from the retailer. There are several 
choices that we could choose for the outside option parameter. A more conservative 
choice is to assume that consumers only consider yogurts offered through the current 
store they are shopping at. In this case, the total sales of yogurt sold in the same store are 
used as the reference. However, this option omits the activity of shop-hopping, which is 
widely observed in consumer behavior (Steiner, 1984). Therefore, we leverage a less 
conservative choice, that is to assume that customers consider purchasing yogurts from 
all stores within a market, including the stores that are not included in our dataset. In this 
case, the total sales of all yogurts in the same market would be used. Specifically, we 
compute s0 as the ratio of total sales of other yogurts on the market that is not observed in 
our dataset (i.e., the outside option) against the total sales of yogurt on the same market 
(including the sales observed in our dataset) during the same time period as our study. 
The above described non-nested model violates the property of the independence of 
irrelevant alternatives. Specifically, consumers usually have preferences for product 
brand, style, etc. In other words, a consumer who purchases a Stonyfield yogurt may be 
more likely to select another Stonyfield yogurt than a Yoplait when their first choice is 
not available. A priori, we do not know what the best nesting structure is. It may be that 
customers are more likely to purchase within the same brand, or they may be more likely 
to purchase within the same organic condition. Thus, we build several models where we 
next our data by Brand, Organic, Style, etc. We finally choose to nest our data by Brand 
and Organic, as suggested in previous literature, consumers recognize both brand and 
organic label as the most important factors of their purchase intention (Konuk, 2018; 
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Bauer et. al., 2013). Therefore, we assume consumers are more likely to purchase within 
the same brand and organic condition when their first choice is not available. 
        We created 233 nests (g=0, 1, 2, …, 232) based on Brand-Organic pairs, where each 
number indicates a different combination of brand and organic attributes, and g=0 
represents the outside option only. Using the Berry inversion method, we derive the 
nested logit model as 
𝑙𝑛(𝑠𝑗) − 𝑙𝑛(𝑠0) = 𝛼𝑝𝑗 + 𝛽𝑥𝑗
′ + 𝜎 𝑙𝑛(𝑠𝑗|𝑔) + 𝜉𝑗                                                                           (3.4) 
where σ is the factor measuring substitutability (0 < σ < 1) and sj|g is the market share of 
product j in nest g. 
3.4.2. CONDITION NESTED MODEL 
        Table 3.7 presents the 2-stage lease square (2SLS) estimates of our condition nested 
model. As can be seen in the table, we find that price has a negative (β=-0.73) and highly 
significant (p < .001) effect on consumers’ choices. Further, the estimate of the 
coefficient r of nested market share is 0.66, which falls in the acceptable range between 0 
and 1, indicating that it captures substitutability (Berry 1994). Finally, the coefficients of 
PrivateLabel is positive and significant, that is, all else equal (including price), demand is 
higher for a private-label product. 
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Table 3.7: Condition Nested Model, IV Estimates 
DV(𝒍𝒏(𝒔𝒋) − 𝒍𝒏(𝒔𝟎)) Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval]        
Price -0.73354*** 0.008777 -83.57 0 -0.7507502 -0.716343 
Ln(Sj|g) 0.665793
*** 0.000441 1506.97 0 0.664927 0.6666589 
PackageSize 0.603629*** 0.005102 118.3 0 0.5936282 0.6136305 
Advertisement -0.23797*** 0.002423 -98.2 0 -0.2427265 -0.233226 
PrivateLabel 0.758617*** 0.006222 121.91 0 0.7464212 0.7708139 
StoreRevenue 0.004215*** 0.000039 106.13 0 0.0041381 0.0042938 
Discount 0.939448*** 0.002602 361.02 0 0.9343486 0.9445489 
TotalVariety 0.001263*** 7.67E-06 164.6 0 0.001248 0.0012781 
Notes: * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01.  
 
        We use 2SLS estimates because it is likely that the product’s price and nested 
market share are correlated with unobserved characteristics. For example, if there are 
unobserved factors (to the researcher) that may cause the demand for a particular brand or 
style to be higher in a certain period, then a seller may set a higher price (by not putting 
up a discount or promotion) for these products during that period. To correct for this 
possible endogeneity, we used instrumental variables (IVs) for price and nested market 
share. Specifically, the sum of the other products’ characteristics (i.e., package size, 
advertisement level, and fat content) within a nest in a market was used as instruments for 
each observation’s price and nested market share. The sum of the other observations’ 
characteristics are appropriate instruments since they are excluded from the utility 
equation (Uij or δj does not depend on product/seller characteristics of other observations) 
and they are correlated with prices via the markups in the first-order conditions (Berry, 
1994; Berry et al., 1995). A similar set of instruments have been used in past operations 
management studies that have used aggregate choice models (e.g., Guajardo et al., 2016; 
McKie et al., 2018). We then tested endogeneity using both Durbin-Wu-Hausman Chi-
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squared and Wu-Hausman F scores. The Durbin Chi-squared statistic of 66024.6 (p < 
.001) and Wu-Hausman F score 33063.8 (p < .001). In the first stage of 2SLS, we 
evaluated the explanatory power of our IVs by using the tests for excluded instruments 
for both price and nested market share. The null hypothesis that the excluded instruments 
have no explanatory power was rejected (Staiger & Stock 1997). Specifically, the F-
statistics (p-value) for price and nested market share were 73524 (p < .001) and 780000 
(p < .001), respectively. Second, we ran the test of underidentification of instruments. 
The null hypothesis that our instruments are underidentified was also rejected. 
Specifically, the Anderson Canonical Correlation LM Statistic is 82000 (p < .001). In 
sum, these tests provide validity to our model specification and the use of instruments to 
address the endogeneity of price and the nested market share variables (Guajardo et al., 
2016; McKie et al., 2018).  
3.5. DISCUSSION OF MAIN RESULTS 
        Using the estimates in table 3.1 and Equation 5, we compute the product’s own and 
cross-price elasticities using yogurt styles and/or organic as nests due to our research 
interests. For example, in table 3, for the own-price elasticities, we estimate whether the 
own-price elasticities of product style k (k = 2, 3, 4, 5) are different than the own-price 
elasticity of product style 1 (Greek yogurt) at the 95% significance level. Following 
McKie et al., (2018), we use the upper and lower confidence interval estimates of α and σ 
to estimate our significance level by checking to see if the elasticity estimates (calculated 
using either the upper or lower values from the 95% confidence intervals) have any 
overlaps. We estimate whether the cross-price elasticities of product pair (i, j) [i≠j, 
(i,j)≠(2,1)] are different from the cross-price elasticity of product type pair (2, 1) at the 
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95% significance level using the upper and lower confidence interval estimates of α and 
σ. As a result, the own-price elasticity shows the resulting percent decrease in market 
share when the price of a yogurt type increases by 1%. And the cross-price elasticity 
shows the resulting percent increase in market share when the price of another yogurt 
type increases by 1%.  
𝜕𝑠𝑖𝑝𝑗
𝜕𝑝𝑗𝑠𝑖
=
{
 
 𝛼𝑝𝑖[
1
1−𝜎
− (
σ
1−σ
) si|k] − 𝛼𝑝𝑖𝑠𝑖  ,        𝑖𝑓 𝑖 = 𝑗
−𝛼𝑝𝑗[(
𝜎
1−𝜎
)𝑠𝑗|𝑘 + 𝑠𝑗] , 𝑖𝑓 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗, 𝑖 ∈ 𝑘, 𝑗 ∉ 𝑘
−𝛼𝑝𝑗𝑠𝑗 ,                                     𝑖𝑓 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗, 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑘
                                                                      (3.5) 
3.5.1. OWN AND CROSS-PRICE ELASTICITY CALCULATIONS BY ORGANIC 
        We first report the own and cross-price elasticity by the organic condition in table 
3.8. The diagonal represents the average own-price elasticities for organic and 
conventional yogurts. The own-price elasticity values show the resulting percent decrease 
in market share when the price of a yogurt increases by 1%. For example, 1% increase in 
conventional yogurt prices in a store would result in on average 4.39% decrease in 
market share for that store. Similarly, 1% increase in organic yogurt price in a store 
would result in on average 5.95% decrease in market share for that store. The off-
diagonal represents the average cross-price elasticity values for organic and conventional 
yogurts. The cross-price elasticity values show how price changes in the conditions listed 
in the columns affect market share for the conditions listed in the table rows. For 
example, 1% increase in conventional yogurt prices in a store would on average increase 
the market share of organic yogurt for that seller by 0.026%. Similarly, 1% increase in 
organic yogurt price in a store would on average increase the market share of 
conventional yogurt for that seller by 0.089%. 
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Table 3.8: Own and Cross-price Elasticity by Organic 
 
Conventional Organic 
Conventional -4.39664 0.08900 
Organic 0.02647† -5.95207* 
Notes: *Denotes own-price elasticity of product type j (j = 2) is different from own-price 
elasticity of product type 1 at 95% significance level.  
                  †Denotes cross-price elasticity of product type pair (i, j) [i ≠ j, (i, j) ≠ (2,1)] is 
different from cross-price elasticity of product type pair (2, 1) at 95% significance level. 
 
        We find that the own-price elasticity for organic yogurt is significantly greater than 
that of conventional yogurt (-5.95 versus -4.39). This finding is consistent with previous 
literature -- Bezawada and Pauwels (2013), that suggests even core organic consumers 
are price sensitive. A possible explanation for this result is that consumers are more 
price-sensitive to products that are more standardized in nature (McKie et al., 2018). 
Where organic products have much more standardized requirements in their production 
process, conventional products do not have strict requirements regarding the raw 
materials, manufacturing processes and transportation processes. The results also suggest 
that although consumers are generally willing to pay higher prices for organic products, 
the high price sensitivity may off-set the benefit of higher pricing if retailers are not 
aware of such market effects. 
        The cross-price elasticity suggests that although conventional and organic products 
are substitutes, the substitution effect is asymmetry. Our results allow us to evaluate the 
cannibalization effect of conventional products to organic products. We find that change 
in organic price has a greater effect on conventional yogurt (0.089) whereas change in 
conventional price has a smaller effect on organic yogurt (0.026). Contrast to Glaser and 
Thompson (2000), who finds that changes in conventional milk prices have a greater 
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effect on organic milk. The different findings may stream from model specification, 
where Glaser and Thompson (2000) used only half-gallon packaged milk data and 
ignored the possible substitution between different package sizes. In reality, it is possible 
that consumers would buy a larger package size to retain low average price (e.g. price per 
gallon) when they see a price increase in half-gallon milk. It is also possible that 
consumers would switch to a lower package sized milk to retain total costs. Failing to 
capture such phenomenon may lead to bias in estimating cross-price elasticity. Another 
possible explanation for this phenomenon is that the overall product variety for organic 
yogurt is much smaller than the product variety for conventional yogurt. Therefore, it is 
more difficult for consumers to find a substitution product with similar taste, style, fat-
content in organic form when consumers’ first choice is a conventional product. On the 
contrary, it is easier for consumers to find a close substitute in the conventional form 
when consumers’ first choice is an organic product. 
3.5.2 OWN AND CROSS-PRICE ELASTICITY CALCULATIONS BY STYLE 
        Table 3.9 shows the own and cross-price elasticity by yogurt styles. From the own-
price elasticity results, we find that Greek yogurt is the most sensitive to price change. 
With 1% price increase in Greek yogurt, the market share of Greek yogurt would 
decrease on average 8.62%, followed by Other (5.07%), Creamy (4.29%), All-Natural 
(4.17%), and Regular (4.07%). Further, there are significant differences in own-price 
elasticity among different yogurt styles. For example, as we could see above, the own-
price elasticities for All-Natural yogurt, Regular yogurt, and Creamy yogurt are much 
lower than Greek yogurt.  
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Table 3.9: Own and Cross-price Elasticity by Style 
Style Greek All-Natural Regular Creamy Other 
Greek -8.62977 0.03127† 0.02673† 0.03896 0.04766† 
All-Natural 0.03855 -4.17157* 0.02239† 0.02045† 0.03141† 
Regular 0.05328† 0.03401† -4.07611* 0.03527† 0.04834† 
Creamy 0.04718† 0.02087† 0.02356† -4.29577* 0.03744 
Other 0.04775† 0.02255† 0.02468† 0.02775† -5.07809* 
Notes: *Denotes own-price elasticity of product type j (j = 2, 3, 4, 5) is different from 
own-price elasticity of product type 1 at 95% significance level. 
                   †Denotes cross-price elasticity of product type pair (i, j) [i ≠ j, (i, j) ≠ (2,1)] is 
different from cross-price elasticity of product type pair (2, 1) at 95% significance level. 
         
        One possible explanation for this result is that own-price elasticity could be 
decreasing by the average price for each product style. Because in our model 
specification, own-price elasticity is a function of the product’s price. However, although 
Greek yogurt does have the highest average price and highest own-price elasticity, the 
other four product styles do not fall into the rule of “the higher price, the higher own-
price elasticity”. For example, the average price for Greek yogurt is 2.08 dollars per pint, 
followed by Creamy (1.63), Regular (1.57), All-Natural (1.55), and Other (1.47). Thus, it 
is feasible that our results do indicate differences in consumers’ sensitivity to product 
style, as the own-price elasticity is not just a reflection of price. 
        Another possible explanation for the own-price elasticity difference is that 
consumers may find it easier to find a close substitute in styles that have more product 
variety than those that have less product variety. In our dataset, we have 333 SKUs in 
Greek yogurt, where we have 148 SKUs in All-Natural yogurt, 2469 SKUs in Regular 
yogurt, 193 SKUs in Creamy yogurt, and 715 SKUs in Other yogurt. Therefore, although 
Greek yogurt has a lower number of SKU than Regular and Other yogurt, it actually has 
more SKUs than All-Natural yogurt and Creamy yogurt. Therefore, we believe that the 
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own-price elasticity is not driven by the availability of substitutes in the same category. 
Rather, our results do indicate that consumers are more sensitive to price changes in 
certain styles. In addition, this additional own-price elasticity in Greek yogurt indicates 
that although it is believed that people are willing to pay a bit more for Greek yogurt 
because it is healthier, the high price sensitivity may off-set the benefit of higher selling 
price if the retailer is not aware of such market effect. 
        From the cross-price elasticity values, we find that different styles of yogurts are 
substitutes, as all cross-price elasticity estimations are positive. Next, we find gains in 
market share of the other four styles are higher when the price of Greek yogurt increase 
as compared to similar increases in the price of the other four styles. This result may 
suggest that regular consumers for Greek yogurt have a higher disposable income 
(Boynton & Novakovic, 2014; Mohammed et al., 2018). This substitution effect is also 
asymmetric, as when Greek yogurt increase 1% in price, the market share of All-Natural 
yogurt, Regular yogurt and Creamy yogurt would increase market share by on average 
0.038%, 0.053% and 0.047% respectively. Whereas when All-Natural yogurt, Regular 
yogurt and Creamy yogurt increases 1% in price, the market share of Greek yogurt would 
only increase 0.031%, 0.026% and 0.038% respectively.  
        We find Regular yogurt seems to be the most possible substitute for all other yogurt 
styles except for Creamy yogurt. When Greek yogurt, All-Natural yogurt, and Other 
yogurt increases 1% in price, the Regular yogurt has the most growth in market share 
(0.053%, 0.034% and 0.048% respectively). However, for Creamy yogurt, the Greek 
yogurt is the closest substitute, as 1% increase in Creamy yogurt price would increase 
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Greek yogurt market share by 0.038%. This is likely resulting from the similar texture 
and taste between the two styles. 
3.5.3 OWN AND CROSS-PRICE ELASTICITY CALCULATIONS BY STYLE AND ORGANIC 
        Table 3.10 shows the own and cross-price elasticity by both yogurt styles and 
organic conditions. The results allow us to further understand (1) How consumers 
evaluate organic products when there are multiple other features and (2) What is the best 
assortment mix for retailers who sell both organic and conventional products.  
        From the own-price elasticity, we find that similar to own-price elasticity calculation 
in 3.5.1, organic products have a higher own-price elasticity in every yogurt style. Our 
findings further suggest that consumers do care about organic pricing. And retailers need 
to be aware of such market effect and avoid pricing organic products too high. Next, we 
find that Organic Greek yogurt has the highest own-price elasticity. 1% increase in 
Organic Greek yogurt price would result in 11.9% decrease in its market share. Although 
Organic Greek yogurt is one of the most expensive types of yogurt in our dataset (2.55 
dollars per pint), which may play a role in its high own-price elasticity, other types of 
yogurt do not show a strong correlation between the average price and own-price 
elasticity. In fact, the Conventional Greek yogurt has an average price of 2.02 dollars per 
pint, which is cheaper than Organic Regular (2.23 dollars per pint), Organic Creamy 
(2.54 dollars per pint) and Organic Other yogurt (2.62 dollars per pint). Yet, the 
Conventional Greek yogurt has higher own-price elasticity than any organic yogurt listed 
above. Another explanation for the high own-price elasticity in Organic Greek yogurt is 
the lack of variety in this product category. Indeed, there are only 25 SKUs in this 
product category, offered by only 2 brands (Stonyfield Oikos and Voskos). However, the 
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own-price elasticity is not just a reflection of product variability as Conventional Greek 
yogurt has 308 SKUs and is offered by 27 brands, while the Organic Regular yogurt has 
only 181 SKUs that are offered by similarly 31 brands. Thus, we believe that consumers 
do have different price sensitivity in Greek yogurt, as the own-price elasticity is not just a 
reflection of price or product variety. This finding in Greek yogurt further suggests 
retailers should beware of their Greek yogurt pricing, as consumers are the most price-
sensitive in this product category. 
        From the cross-price elasticity, we are able to directly examine the effect of 
cannibalization from conventional products to different types of organic products. For 
Organic Greek yogurt, we find that when the price of Organic Greek yogurt increases by 
1%, the yogurt types that gain the most market share are Conventional Creamy, 
Conventional All-Natural, and Organic All-Natural. A possible explanation for this result 
is that consumers for Greek yogurt are attracted by the texture of Creamy yogurt and the 
healthy massage carried by All-Natural yogurt. However, as these consumers are price-
sensitive, they are less likely to purchase Organic Creamy yogurts which have very 
similar price to Greek yogurt. Further, the substitution among these groups is 
asymmetric. Where increase in Organic Greek yogurt price by 1% would result in more 
than 0.2% market share increase in Conventional Creamy, Conventional All-Natural and 
Organic All-Natural yogurt, 1% increase in Conventional Creamy, Conventional All-
Natural and Organic All-Natural yogurt would only increase Organic Greek yogurt 
market share by 0.08%, 0.06% and 0.01% respectively. 
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Table 3.10: Own and Cross-price Elasticity by Style and Organic 
Notes: *Denotes own-price elasticity of product type j (j = 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 ,7 ,8 ,9 ,10) is different from own-price elasticity of product 
type 1 at 95% significance level. 
                  †Denotes cross-price elasticity of product type pair (i, j) [i ≠ j, (i, j) ≠ (2,1)] is different from cross-price elasticity of product 
type pair (2, 1) at 95% significance level. 
 
Greek C Greek O All-Natural 
C 
All-Natural 
O 
Regular C Regular O Creamy C Creamy O  Other C Other O 
Greek C -8.1942 0.1544† 0.06096† 0.00993† 0.02212† 0.15568† 0.0718† 0.04988 0.0705† 0.07861† 
Greek O 0.0501 -11.915* 0.06232† 0.01090† 0.02307† 0.15993† 0.0840† 0.0447† 0.0817† 0.07773† 
All-Natural C 0.0669† 0.2241† -4.0267* 0.01080† 0.02123† 0.15192† 0.0669† 0.0367† 0.0804† 0.07422† 
All-Natural O 0.0707† 0.2180† 0.05109 -5.4715* 0.02163† 0.14298† 0.0720† 0.0158† 0.0848† 0.06040† 
Regular C 0.0478† 0.1788† 0.04151† 0.00732† -4.0161* 0.14193† 0.0384† 0.0403† 0.04980 0.06655† 
Regular O 0.0455† 0.1650† 0.04411† 0.00647† 0.01935† -5.4376* 0.0449† 0.0334† 0.0551† 0.06151† 
Creamy C 0.0664† 0.2313† 0.04916† 0.01064† 0.02037† 0.14666† -4.013* 0.0364† 0.0693† 0.0736† 
Creamy O 0.0474† 0.1552† 0.03862† 0.00053† 0.02065† 0.13044† 0.0448† -4.849* 0.0541† 0.05125 
Other C 0.0572† 0.1976† 0.05133† 0.01030† 0.02169† 0.15379† 0.0596† 0.0401† -4.933* 0.0751† 
Other O 0.0567† 0.1972† 0.04151† 0.00460† 0.01991† 0.13372† 0.0477† 0.0258† 0.0591† -5.630* 
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        With regard to Organic All-Natural yogurt, this product category has the lowest 
cross-price elasticity among all product types. 1% increase in Organic All-Natural yogurt 
price would result in 0.01% or lower market share increase in all other product 
categories. This result may be driven by the fact that all Organic All-Natural yogurt are 
supplied by Stonyfield Farm brand, and has an exceptionally low average price per pint 
(0.93 dollars). In fact, the average price for Organic All-Natural yogurt is the lowest 
among all 10 product categories. However, the Organic All-Natural yogurt is rarely the 
first choice when people substitute from other product categories (only exception is when 
Conventional Other yogurt price increases). Our finding suggests that the abnormally low 
price in organic products may raise concerns from consumers which would ultimately 
hurt the sales. 
        As for Organic Regular yogurt, it has relatively high cross-price elasticity in all 
product categories. That is, 1% price increase in Organic Regular yogurt would increase 
the market share of all other product categories by around 0.15%. Our findings suggest 
that competition between Conventional Regular yogurt and Organic Regular yogurt does 
exist. However, Organic Regular yogurt is much more vulnerable in this competition, as 
1% price increase in Organic Regular yogurt would increase Conventional Regular 
yogurt market share by 0.14%, while 1% price increase in Conventional Regular yogurt 
would merely increase Organic Regular yogurt market share by 0.01%. 
3.6. ROBUSTNESS CHECK 
        One possible problem in our research is that we used 4 years of weekly data from 
the year 2008 to 2011. Whereat the beginning of this time period, Greek yogurt was very 
new to the market, therefore, creates a potential bias in the own and cross-price elasticity. 
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Therefore, we re-estimate our models using only the last 8 weeks of our data, where at 
the end of year 2011, Greek yogurt has become very mature on the market. We present 
our results in table 3.11 to table 3.13, where own and cross-price elasticity are calculated 
by organic, style, and organic-style accordingly. 
        Our results show that all previous findings are consistent. Moreover, the own-price 
elasticity for Organic yogurt and Greek yogurt is higher than the full sample estimation. 
Our results further validate that organic consumers indeed are price sensitive. 
 
Table 3.11: Robustness Check: Last 8 Weeks Own and Cross-price Elasticity by Organic 
 
Conventional Organic 
Conventional -6.63356 0.10677† 
Organic 0.03026 -8.35953* 
Notes: *Denotes own-price elasticity of product type j (j = 2) is different from own-price 
elasticity of product type 1 at 95% significance level.  
                  †Denotes cross-price elasticity of product type pair (i, j) [i ≠ j, (i, j) ≠ (2,1)] is 
different from cross-price elasticity of product type pair (2, 1) at 95% significance level. 
 
 
Table 3.12: Robustness Check: Last 8 Weeks Own and Cross-price Elasticity by Style 
Style Greek All-Natural Regular Creamy Other 
Greek -10.33744 0.05260† 0.02775† 0.05160† 0.05852† 
All-Natural 0.04616 -5.611529* 0.02868† 0.04987† 0.05983† 
Regular 0.04807† 0.05505† -5.64319* 0.05443† 0.06053† 
Creamy 0.04702 0.05038† 0.02904† -5.95301* 0.05747† 
Other 0.04914† 0.05321† 0.02953† 0.05251† -7.68047* 
Notes: *Denotes own-price elasticity of product type j (j = 2, 3, 4, 5) is different from 
own-price elasticity of product type 1 at 95% significance level. 
                   †Denotes cross-price elasticity of product type pair (i, j) [i ≠ j, (i, j) ≠ (2,1)] is 
different from cross-price elasticity of product type pair (2, 1) at 95% significance level. 
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Table 3.13: Robustness Check: Last 8 Weeks Own and Cross-price Elasticity by Style and Organic 
 
Notes: *Denotes own-price elasticity of product type j (j = 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 ,7 ,8 ,9 ,10) is different from own-price elasticity of product 
type 1 at 95% significance level. 
                  †Denotes cross-price elasticity of product type pair (i, j) [i ≠ j, (i, j) ≠ (2,1)] is different from cross-price elasticity of product 
type pair (2, 1) at 95% significance level. 
                                                                                                                                                  
 
Greek C Greek O All-Natural 
C 
All-Natural 
O 
Regular C Regular O Creamy C Creamy O Other C Other O 
Greek C -9.9969 0.1536† 0.06452† 0.01079† 0.02246† 0.15843† 0.0766† 0.05264† 0.07213† 0.08347† 
Greek O 0.0499 -15.968* 0.06808† 0.01227† 0.02390† 0.16585† 0.0940† 0.04914 0.08530† 0.08697† 
All-Natural C 0.0628† 0.2019† -5.4749* 0.01532† 0.02784† 0.19481† 0.1159† 0.06240† 0.11706† 0.11528† 
All-Natural O 0.0689† 0.2028† 0.07560† -7.4244* 0.03054† 0.18668† 0.1229† 0.03352† 0.12427† 0.11123† 
Regular C 0.0435† 0.1496† 0.06193† 0.00875† -5.5694* 0.16382† 0.0633† 0.05609† 0.06316† 0.08324† 
Regular O 0.0416† 0.14211† 0.06282† 0.00780† 0.02227† -7.2848* 0.0752† 0.04223† 0.07027† 0.07586† 
Creamy C 0.0598† 0.1984† 0.07415† 0.01483† 0.02730† 0.19140† -5.518* 0.06002† 0.10976† 0.11155† 
Creamy O 0.0439† 0.1322† 0.06173† 0.00083† 0.02316† 0.14326† 0.0769† -6.471* 0.06777† 0.07314† 
Other C 0.0532† 0.1752† 0.07110† 0.01339† 0.02562† 0.17909† 0.0996† 0.0552† -7.6608* 0.09845† 
Other O 0.0510 0.1656† 0.06938† 0.00794† 0.02419† 0.16843† 0.0961† 0.04863 0.0886† -7.8047* 
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3.7. CONCLUSION 
        The organic food market has experienced tremendous growth. Along with the rapid 
growth of organic products, new product features have also emerged and prospered. 
Although how organic assortment, price, and promotions drive retailer performance has 
been studied in previous works (Ngobo, 2011; Bezawada & Pauwels, 2013), the extant 
literature does not, however, provide a clear understanding of how other product-related 
(style, brand, nutrition, etc.) and seller-related factors influence consumers’ preferences 
when choosing between organic products and conventional product. In response, we 
study how consumers make complex purchase decisions involving organic products 
among numerous other non-organic related attributes. By doing so, we also seek to find 
the best assortment mix for retailers that carry both organic products and conventional 
products. 
        Our main findings suggest that organic condition, product style, and seller attributes 
are all highly influential in shaping consumers’ purchasing decisions. Further, the 
relationship between organic and conventional products is much more nuanced and 
context-specific than previously shown. We find organic products always have a higher 
own-price elasticity than conventional products. Our results suggest that even organic 
consumers are willing to pay a higher price, they are also sensitive to organic prices. This 
phenomenon holds true even for the most health-conscious consumers----the Organic 
Greek yogurt consumers. In fact, Organic Greek yogurt yields the highest own-price 
elasticity, suggesting even the core organic consumers are price sensitive. Therefore, 
retailers should carefully price their organic products, so that consumers would not be 
driven away from the high organic pricing. 
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        From cross-price elasticity perspective, the asymmetry between organic products 
and conventional products suggests that price change in conventional products has less 
effect on organic products than vice-versa, consistent with the asymmetric price 
competition literature (Sethuraman & Srinivasan, 2002). However, this effect is also 
content-specific. Where in some product categories such as All-Natural yogurt and 
Creamy yogurt, price change in conventional products has a greater effect on organic 
products. This finding suggests that consumers have different preferences for different 
product specifications. Manufacturers and retailers should carefully study consumers’ 
preferences in order to set the optimal price for their products. 
        In addition, we find that a low price strategy does not work well for organic products 
either. As we could see from the example of Organic All-Natural yogurt, the low unit 
price for this product category does not result in low own-price elasticity. Neither does 
the low unit price increase more market share when other product categories increase 
price.  
         Finally, we find that Conventional Creamy yogurt and All-Natural yogurt are close 
substitutes for Organic Greek yogurt. Therefore, we find evidence that there is a group of 
“health-conscious” consumers as well as a group of consumers that focuses on the taste 
and texture of food. Retailers could utilize such information and optimize their 
assortment mix to attract and retain their customers. 
        The following limitations from our study provide promising trajectories for further 
analyses. First, our study involved only one product (yogurt) and product type (diary). 
Future research may consider replicating our analysis across other product categories. 
Second, due to the data limitation, we do not have accurate store locations, therefore we 
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could not form the accurate choice set a consumer face when purchasing a product. 
Future research may consider using more accurate geographic information to form a more 
accurate choice set for consumers. Finally, we utilized data from the year 2008 to 2011, 
where recent development in organic markets may have further changed consumers’ 
attitudes and habits towards buying organic products. Future research could utilize more 
recent data to replicate our analysis. 
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CHAPTER 4 
CONCLUSION 
        In this dissertation, we investigate the impact of organic products on conventional 
products and on retailer assortment planning. Specifically, we seek to answer the 
following research questions. 
• Does conventional product variety increase or decrease when organic product is 
introduced (or its variety increases) at the store level?  
• Does the control of assortment decisions in the supply chain affect assortments 
between organic and conventional products? 
• How consumers evaluate organic products when there are multiple features and 
attributes of the organic product, and directly evaluate the cannibalization effect 
of conventional products on organic products.  
        Results from our study show that introducing organic products will result in an 
increase in conventional product variety. This positive relationship between organic 
product introduction and conventional product variety also holds when stores increase 
their organic product offerings. We also find that when manufacturers are more 
concentrated, and therefore more powerful in the supply chain and have control over 
product assortment decisions, stores tend to have a less positive relationship between 
organic product and conventional product variety. Similarly, when retailers are more 
powerful with a strong private label presence, they tend to reduce branded conventional 
products and increase private-label conventional products when introducing organic 
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products. In addition, we find organic products always have a higher own-price elasticity 
than conventional products, suggesting that even organic consumers are willing to pay a 
higher price, they are also sensitive to organic prices. We also find that the cross-price 
elasticities between organic products and conventional products are asymmetry. This 
asymmetry cross-price elasticity suggests that price change in conventional products has 
less effect on organic products than vice-versa.  
        Our studies make several theoretical contributions to research streams in assortment 
planning and supply chain management. First, we show that introducing and increasing 
organic product variety has a greater market expansion effect than its cost effect 
associated with increasing product variety. That is, organic products, thanks to their 
specialized group of customers, stimulate the demand for a variety of conventional 
products within the same category. Therefore, instead of switching out the existing 
conventional products with new organic products, retailers are better off further increase 
the conventional product variety in the same product category. On the other hand, we also 
confirm that the cost effect is significant when retailers face strict shelf space constraints. 
Second, we show that the relationship between organic and conventional product 
assortments are subject to the supply chain power and governance between the retailers 
and manufacturers. In particular, we consider that supply chain power resides with a 
concentrated group of manufacturers or retailers with strong private label presence. We 
show that these two mechanisms lead to different results for conventional product 
variety. With a smaller, concentrated manufacturer group, the retailer has less power and 
control over product assortment decisions. And in this case, we show that a 
manufacturer’s concerns of cost efficiency associated with organic products have a 
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stronger effect on retailer assortment decisions, thereby mitigating the market expansion 
effect for manufacturer brands. Moreover, we show that retailers with a strong private 
label presence may leverage the pattern of expansion of organic product variety as an 
opportunity to increase their private label conventional products and reduce their reliance 
on national brand conventional product variety. Third, we find organic products always 
have a higher own-price elasticity than conventional products. Our findings suggest that 
even though organic consumers are willing to pay a higher price, they are also sensitive 
to organic prices. Fourth, we find that the cross-price elasticity is asymmetry between 
organic products and conventional products. However, this effect is also content-specific. 
In some product categories such as All-Natural yogurt and Creamy yogurt, price change 
in conventional products has a greater effect on organic products. This finding suggests 
that consumers have different preferences for different product specifications. 
Manufacturers and retailers should carefully study consumers’ preferences in order to set 
the optimal price for their products. 
        Practitioners could also benefit from our findings of this study in a number of ways. 
For retailers that have not yet launched organic products on their shelves, this study 
points to the benefit of overall store sales from the introduction of organic products. 
Retailers could use organic products to attract new variety-seeking consumers, who could 
also buy conventional products as well. This way stores are also encouraged to add 
variety for conventional products also. Increasing both organic product variety and 
conventional variety will result in higher category level sales. Our study also suggests 
retailers to carefully study their customers’ specific preferences on both organic and 
conventional products. Further, they could leverage such information and select the best 
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assortment mix within a product category to achieve better performance. From a 
manufacturer’s perspective, by facing the growing pressure of supplying organic products 
and meeting retailers’ demand for more variety in conventional products, manufacturers 
should invest in clear product differentiation of their national brands (for organic and 
conventional products) so that customers can be wooed away from the retail stores’ 
organic or private label brands. In addition, since producing both conventional products 
and organic products may be costly, manufacturers could consider mergers and 
acquisitions with small organic product producers, thereby increasing their overall 
product portfolios.  
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